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: Introduction 
. .  . . . .  . . .  
..: . . 
. . . .. 
. . Writing in the 1790s, patrick Colquhoun opened . . his treatiee on 
. . 
the ~blice of the Metropolis by declaring that "The enlaiged state of . . 
" 
Society, the vast extent of moving property, and the'unexampled wealth 
I .  . 
. . 
. . 
. of the Metropolis, joined to depraved habits and loose conduct of ) 
great proportion of the lower classes of the people; and-above allq 
the want of an appropriate Police applicable to the object of prevqne 
tion, will, after a careful perusal of this work, reconcile the atten- 
tive mind to a belief of the actual existence of evils which could pot 
otherwise have been credited" (Colquhoun 1800: 4). His prescient, 
fact-filled treatise laid out a simple argument: that rising comezcisl 
prosperity increased the amount of movable property exposed in public 
places; that the more property exposed, the more stolen; that prosperity 
also led, in several different ways (Drink being prominent among them), 
to a decay. in the morals of the lower classes; that moral decay like- 
wise promoted a, rise in thievery; that intelligent policing could 
r 
check crime not only by a) increasing the surveillance of property in 
public places but also by b) raising the disincentives to crime--making 
them more effective rather than, as was then the habit, by making them 
more severe--and c) controlling the sources of moral decay, such as 
wineshops, prostitution and gambling. 
Much of ~ol~uhou*' s wisdom has since become conventional 
wisdom. The British used Colquhoun's arguments in building up a 
metropolitan police force, and then national police forces, thitty to 
fifty years later. Yet even now, close to two centuries after 
- .  
. Colquhoun wrote with such force and such ample documentation, we are 
. . 
uncertain which parts of his argument are correct. 
I. 
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Our uncertainty is curious, but not inexplicable. It is 
curious that we have made fewer improvements on Colquhoun's theories 
than on those of his near-contemporaries, Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus. 
One might have thought Colquhoun would be easier to improve on. But 
Smith and Malthus left central ideas whose combination of generality, 
simplicity, rigor and verifiability opened a wide way to further inquiry. 
The moral-decay side of Colquhoun's scheme contained crucial ambiguities, 
and assimilated all too easily into existing prejudices concerning the 
character (or lack of character) of the poor. Finally, a number of 
major elements in Smith's and Malthus' arguments corresponded to 
observable aspects of social life--wages, prices, birth.rates, 
,agricultural production--which were already-being measured widely, 
and sometimes being measured effectively. The same cannot be said for 
crime and moral decay. 
Let us resume the effort of improving Colquhoun. This paper 
makes a small contribution to the formulation of appropriate arguments 
about the effects of the power, range and efficiency of law-enforcement 
agencies on recorded crime. We lay out an elementary view of the 
determinants of property crimes, offer some hypotheses about the effect 
of long-range changes in policing on total property crime and recorded 
property crime,, and present relevant evidence from the nineteenth- 
century experi'ences of Canada, the United States, England knd France. 
~h~ visibility of crime 
Tracing the ebb and flow of crime is like estimating an 
ecanomy's production of personal services. The definitions of services 
f.luctuate so much, and so much goes on outside the market, that changes 
in def'inition, changes in registration and changes in production are 
terribly hard to distinguish, "Crime , " 1 ike "personal service, " cove& . 
. . . . . . 
a heterogeneous set of behaviors- The common property of criminal - 
. :. kinds of behavior is simp1y.thar t.here are laws against them, and agents . - 
empowered co enforce those laws. 
. . 
. . In reconstructing the history of crime, we can requce our diffi- 
. .  . culties by squarely recognizing the situation, instead of treating it 
. 
. ".. '  .!. . _ as an inconvenient obstacle an the way t-o the truth. Just as by "per- 
sonal ser:vicesr' we ordina~ily, understand those services which enter 
. . the'market, by "recorded crime" we can understand the registration by 
. law-enforcement agencies of violations of the law. 
Our general reasoning follows that of Boudon and Davidovitch 
in France and Reiss and Black in the United States (Bordua and Reiss 
1967, Reiss 1970, Black 1970, 1971 and 1972, Davidovitch 1970, 
Davidovitch and Boudon 1965). The central social fact we have to 
account for is not infractions of the law, but the activation of 
. , 
the criminal justice system against infractions of the law. The 
, I  notion of a "true" crime rate is a chimera. It is a fiction, if only 
because a large proportion of the criminal statutesof almost any 
government are not enforced. Are infractions of unenforced, or 
unenforceable, statutes part of the "true" prevalence of crime? If 
. . not,by what standard do we include statutes which are inefficiently 
. . or eelectfvely enforced? 
, . 
We can't, however, dispense with the idea of a p.001 of pro- 
~hibited behaviol out of which police and prosecutors select some 
cases for actf.on, The .ide& Is a useful simplification of reality; . 
? '  . . 
, I  . for a few well-defined pcohlbited ~ehaviors, such as homicide, we 
, . . . . . 
. . even have some hope of matching the theoretical construct with 
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estimates of the "true1' prevalence of the behavior. For the most 
part, however, the Idea ot a true prevalence rate will serve as a 
convenfenc fiction on the way to the study of reiorded crime. 
Several different k~nds 01 lrldices can serve our purposes: 
crimes known t s  the palice, rodzviduals charged with crimes, and 
others. Since rec~rding retrrs to the behavior of law-enforcement 
agencies, some visible crlmes will be optical illusions: accidental 
deaths identified 6s hom~cldes, losses reported as thefts, assaults 
which never occurred. 
The vcllume and d ~ s t  rlbclkon of recorded crime change as functions 
of three factors: 
a. shifts in the range of' behavior which law-enforcement aganciee' . . 
are empowered to record; 
b ,  alceratlons in the agencies' procedures for detecting and 
recording prohrblted behavior; they depend not only on the 
organizational struc.ture but also on the willingness of 
citizens t o  reporc, and of officials to pursue, infractions; 
c .  changes in the ftequency or distribution of the prohibited 
behav io t , 
Under ordf.naxy circums~ancee, we have official records which display 
fluctuations in crime, and we want to allocate rhe fluctuations among 
the three factors- If we are lucky or skilled enough to be able to 
estimate or to hold constant any rwo of the factors, then we can 
'reasonably make i.nferences concerning the behavior. of the third factor 
, .  . 8 , .  
from fluctuations in recorded crlme. . . 
. .  , 
' 5  ':. On t.he whole, we dre much more likely to have reliable infor- . . 
. ;. , ..' 
mation concerning the power. and the procedures of law-enforcement . . . . 
. . .  
agencies than concerning the frequency of.prohibited behavior. Most 
often, therefore, we. will be trying to deduce fluctuations in the 
pattern or ,volume .of some sort 6f prohibited behavior from fluctuations 
in its recorded portion; we will do so by means of an argument concern- 
ing the action of the other two factors--that they are constant, that 
they display some steady trend, that they follow a certain pattern of 
bias, or some other argument. 
Policing and Crime 
The relationship between poliiing and crime--recorded or total-- 
is nicely complex'. It is a feed-back relationship: the vqlum? and . . 
. pattern of crime . continuously . affect the volume and pattern bf policing, 
and vice versa. Suppose by "policing" we mean the detection and appze- 
hension 6f violators of laws, and by professional we mean the 
activity of full-time government employees specialized in the detection 
and apprehension of violators of laws. Policing is as old as law. 
Professional policing, on the other hand, is a rare and recent histor- 
ical phenomenon. ~lthough it has a few interesting precedents, .it is 
essentially a creature of the modem national state, European states, 
for example, had police powers of various sorts from their very 
beginnings. That is, indeed, how we recognize them as states. But 
before the nineteenth century, they usually enforced their laws 
through temporary assemblies of citizens and through officers and. 
agencies whose primary activities were not the detection, apprehension 
or punishment of criminals. 
As David Bayley has noted,'the .forms of specialized police 
agencies which grew up in.different western states.corresp'onded 
faithfully to the organization of other branches of the national . 
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administration (Bayley 1971, 1974). Corresponding to their intense 
national centralization, for example, both France and Italy have just 
A .' 
two thoroughly national police forces (Surete Nationale and Gendarmerie; 
Guardia di Pubblica Sicurezza and Carabinieri). Germany, organized in 
a federal structure, does mose-of its policing through separate regional 
police forces,.each responsible to a state legislature. Although these 
contemporary police forces all had eighteenth-century antecedents, they 
generally crystallized, along with other national administrative struc- 
tures, in the nineteenth century; after that, they changed relatively 
little. 
If the organizational forms of police forces were already 
fairly fixed by some .time in the nineteenth century, their sizes and 
geographic distributions were not. In all western countries, the 
range and intensity of professional policing have increased greatly 
in the last two centuries. France is one of the examples we take up 
later. In 1850, France had about 20,000 full-time professional police. 
That was after a half-century of expansion in policing. By 1950, the 
\ 
number of full-time professionals was around 138,000 (Le Clere 1964: 
121-122). The rise went from about 15 to about 70 police per 10,000 
persons in the labor force, from about 6 to about 35 per 10,000 in 
the general population. If we can use the relative rates of growth 
of the Gendarmerie (with fundamental responsibility for rural patrol- 
ling) and the National Police (operating mainly in cities and towns) 
as evidence, policing in France urbanized more rapidly than the 
general population.did during that century. As the Gendarmerie about 
doubled in size, the National Police multiplied by twenty. 
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Not all countries followed the same course or the same pace. 
A major point of this essay is to establish the differences in 
policing among countries. Nevertheless, the rise of professional 
policing occurred throughout the western-world as industrialization, 
urbanization.and the concentration-of power in national.--states pro- 
ceeded. We are not sure how much of the common trend.is.due to imi- 
tation from country to country;how.much due to similar responses to 
situations inherent in rapid social change, how much due to by- 
products of other processes such as bureaucratization or the profes- 
sionalization of work. We are sure that there is a causal connection 
between the expansion of policing and the formation of strong states 
with urban-industrial social organization. 
What effect did the expansion of policing in-western countries 
have on the frequency of crime? That depends on whether we are discus- 
sing total crime or recorded crime. Consider recorded crime first. 
The intensification of policing undoubtedly tended to raise the propor- 
tion of all violations of the law which came to the attention of crime- 
control specialists and .thereby became visible. Let's stress the 
tended: to the extent that legal prohibitions of different kinds of 
behavior or incentives to violate existing laws expanded faster than 
the intensification of policing, the actual proportion becoming visible 
declined. In at least the early stages of the growth of policing in 
western countries, we guess that policing grew more rapidly than the 
scope of the law or the incentives to violate it, and that at least 
part of the widespread increase in reported crime during the early 
nineteenth century results from a rise in crime's visibility. 
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And total crime? That is even more'debatable, We are 
inclined to believe (and will later lay out some evidence supporting 
our belief) that the net effect of policing is to diminish the fre- 
quency of illegal acts by increasing their probable cost. That is 
least 1ikely.for individual victimless crimes such as vagrancy, 
where the essence of the offense is-to be discovered in a certain 
condition by an officer of the law., It is debatable for crimes against 
persons such as homicide, rape and assault, where a calculus of costs 
and benefits is generally hard to apply. Policing probably has a 
somewhat more direct negative effect on collective victimless crimes 
such as unlawful assembly, because the probability of police sur- 
veillance or retaliation raises the cost of mobilizing the group in 
the first place. The strongest negative net effect, however, should 
touch crimes against property, especially those which yield an 
immediate material return to the criminal; there, shifts in relative 
costs of acquiring the gain legally or illegally should significantly 
affect the frequency of illegal means, and policing should strongly 
affect the costs of illegal means. 
ldplicitly, our ordering of these rough categories of crime 
depends on two variables: 1) the extent to which the potential 
law-breaker makes a deliberate comparison of legal and illegal 
means before commencing the behavior in question, 2) the extent to 
which professional police are likely to observe or be available for 
sanctioning the illegal behavior. The second variable, in turn, has 
two rather different components: 2a) the extent to which infractions 
occur in spaces which police can routinely monitor, which means 
essentially in public spaces, 2b) the extent to which interaction 
-9- 
with an officer of the law enters into the determination of whether 
the infraction has taken place. 
To the extent that.the potential law-breaker makes a deliberate 
I 
comparison ..of legal and il1,egal. means, policing will ... have a strong 
negative effect on the beliavior:in:'question: policing-raises the 
relative cost of the.ill.ega1 alternative.. mere .is-no..reason to think, 
however, that. .the ..effect of p.olicing oli 'visibi'lity is greater for 
infractions invoking deliberate.comparison of legal vs. illegal means 
than for infrac.tions~involving no such comparison. There may even be 
a slight negative effect of polichg on visibility in this regard: to 
the extent that .the potential criminal weighs legal against illegal 
means, his incentive to choose means which are likely to escape detec~ 
tion,rises with policing.' Concretely, our reasoning comes down to 
this sort of thing: all other things being equal, actual violations 
of laws governing stock transfers ("hich presumably involve consider- 
able prior reflection on legal, semi-legal and illegal means) decline 
more decisively in response to policing than do actual violations of 
laws governing child abuse (which-.presumably involve little prior 
weighing of illegal and legal means), but when it comes to effect of 
policing on their visibility, there is not much difference between. 
the two kinds of offenses. 
To the extent that a certain kind of offense is concentrated 
in public spaces, .policing.will tend to diminish its frequency, but 
greatly increase the visibility of those offenses which occur. The 
contrast between public drunkenness and fornication is a possible 
case in point; if our hypotheses are correct, the actual prevalence 
of public drunkenness (although not necessarily of drunkenness in 
gene ra l )  should d e c l i n e  w i t h  p o l i c i n g  more - than  t h e  a c t u a l  preva lence  
of f o r n i c a t i o n  does, and t h e  v i s i b i l i t y  of such p u b l i c  drunkenness a s  
does occur  should i n c r e a s e  much more than  t h e  v i s i b i l i t y  of such 
f o r n i c a t i o n  a s  does occur .  
To t h e  ex t en t  t h a t ' t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of a n  o f f ense  inc ludes  i n t e r -  
a c t i o n  w i t h  an o f f i c e r  of t h e  law, t h e  expansion of pol'icing w i l l  tend 
t o  i n c r e a s e  i t s  prevalence,  and a l s o  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  v i s i b i l i t y  of 
t hose  i n f r a c t i o n s  which a c t u a l l y  occur.  Offenses such a s  r e s i s t i n g  
a r r e s t ,  o b s t r u c t i n g  j u s t i c e ,  contempt of cou r t ,  a s  w e l l  a s  some 
ve r s ions  of unlawful assembly, r a t e  h i g h  on t h i s  v a r i a b l e ;  our  hypoth- 
e s i s  says  t h a t  they should i n c r e a s e  a s  a f u n c t i o n  of po l i c ing  more 
r a p i d l y  than  do a l l  o t h e r  Einds of o f f enses .  
I f  t hese  hypotheses were c o r r e c t ,  they would provide  a way 
of e s t ima t ing  t h e  f i c t i t i o u s  b u t  necessary  " true" prevalence of 
crime from information concerning recorded crime. We a l r eady  have 
open t o  us  t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  of using independent e s t ima te s  of t h e  
I I  t r ue"  prevalence (from unobt rus ive  observa t ion ,  p o l l i n g ,  i n d i r e c t  
measurement of proper ty  l o s s e s ,  and s o  on) t o  a r r i v e  a t  under- 
r e p o r t i n g  r a t i o s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r i e s  of o f f enses ,  and then  t o  
apply those  r a t i o s  i n  r e v e r s e  t o  new r e p o r t s  of law enforcement. 
Our argument sugges ts  another  p o s s i b i l i t y :  a gene ra l  weight ing 
s t r a t e g y  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  c l a s s e s  of e s t ima te s .  For example, one 
would g r e a t l y  i n f l a t e  e s t ima te s  of o f f enses  which concent ra te  i n  
pub l i c  spaces  i f  p o l i c i n g  were f e e b l e ,  b u t  i n f l a t e  them much l e s s  
i f  p o l i c i n g  were ex tens ive .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, whether an o f f e n s e  
e n t a i l e d  p r i o r  weighing of l e g a l  a g a i n s t  i l l e g a l  means would not  
a f f e c t  how much we i n f l a t e d  our  e s t ima te s  i n  t h e  presence o r  absence 
of heavy po l i c ing .  
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Let us close in on property crimes. By our argument, the 
I I true" prevalence of property crimes--everything else being equal-- 
should decline significantly as a consequence of increased policing. 
Property crimes are quite likely to involve prior weighing of legal 
vs. illegal means, have some tendency to occur in public rather 
than private spaces, but depend very little on interaction with an 
officer. As a consequence, the visibility of those property crimes 
, 
which occur should increase moderately with expanded policing: 
more than homicide, perhaps, but much less than most public order 
crimes. 
Everything else is not equal. Other factors than policing ' 
affect the pattern and frequency of crimes against property. We 
can group those other factors under the following general headings: 
1) the extent of private-property, 2) the need for property, 3) 
control of the propertyless, 4) location of property, 5) probable 
penalties of misappropriation. In the particular historical con- 
text we are studying, the five factors translate in approximately 
this fashion: 
1. The proportion of all valued property which is under 
the control of individuals or small groups and protected by the 
law; the higher the proportion, the more frequent the crime. 
2. The extent to which acquiring property makes it pos- 
sible for people to carry on their valued day-to-day activities, 
vs. the extent to which not having property makes these activi- 
ties impossible; the greater the facilitation, the more frequent 
the crime. 
3.  The extent to which the relatively proiertyless live 
their.lives under the immediate; comprehensive supervision of 
those who control property, as opposed to being alien to them, un- 
connected with them or controlled only indirectly by them, the 
more immediate and comprehensive the supervision, the less fre- 
quent the crime. 
4. The extent to which valued property is accessible in 
or from public spaces, and can be moved easily into private 
spaces; the more accessible and easily moved, the more frequent 
the crime. 
5. Prevailing estimates of the probable penalties ( = 
probability x severity) of apprehension for misappropriation of 
property; the higher the estimates, the less frequent the crime. 
The three main factors behind those prevailing estimates are 
probably: 
a )  the extent of surveillance of employees handling 
their employers' property; 
b) the efficiency of accounting systems in organiza- 
tions handling movable property; 
c) the availability and efficiency of.-policing. 
Our list is long. Yet it excludes such variables as the presence 
of criminal subcultures, the pace of social change, the extent 
of personal disorganization and the availability of criminal 
role models--to mention a few factors often named in discussions 
of the causes of.crime: Although it leaves plenty of.room for 
individual irrationality and compulsion, the list treatslarge 
variations in property crime as functions of the ease and ad- 
vantageousness of the illegal acquisition of property. 
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Policing enters the argument most directly in Factors 4 
and 5: as a check on the accessibility and mobility of valued 
property, as an influence on the probable cost of apprehension 
for violating the law. But it also has something to-do with 
the other-.factors. fn general, a rfsfng intensity-of policing 
decreases the advantageousness and, especially, the ease of 
illegal property acquisition. 
Hypotheses about the Historical Experience 
In order to apply this line of argument to western his- 
torical experience, we have to estimate the timing, magnitude 
and relative impact of changes in the many variables on the 
list. We shall do far less than that: simply sketch some of 
the main trends and connections. Let us go quickly down our 
checklist of factors affecting the frequency of property crime: 
1. Property controlled by individuals and small groups: 
From 1800 until at least the end of the century, this propor- 
tion surely increased, although after 1900 the rise of large 
organizations and the expansion of government may have counter- 
acted the trend. Net effect: to promote property crime un- 
til at least 1900. 
2. Necessity of property for valued activities: in- 
creasing continuously sfnce 1800, and thereby promoting property 
crime. 
3. Propertyless under immediate surveillance of prop- 
ertied:' declining more or less continuously since 1800, 
probably with some acceleration (resulting from increasing home- 
work segregation, declining importance of domestic servants, 
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etc.) in the twentieth century. Consequence: promotion of prop- 
erty crime, especially in the twentieth century. 
4 .  Accessibility and mobility of valued property: 
increasing slowly with nineteenth-century urbanization, more rapidly 
with twentieth century, as epftomized by automobile theft. '.A. trend 
partly compensated for by the Increased intensity, efficiency and 
generality of policing of public spaces. Net effect probably some 
promotion of property crime, especially in the twentieth century. 
5. Prevailing estimates of the penalities of apprehen- 
sion: rising continuously, mainly as a function of expanded polic- 
ing. Result: strong tendency for property crime to decline, all 
other things being equal. 
For the nineteenth century, we suggest that Factor 5 out- 
weighed all the others. Policing expanded and became more efficient 
throughout the western world, although the pace, timing and form of 
the change varied considerably from place to place. The arrival of 
a policed world was so rapid and powerful a change that it counTer- 
acted the many factors promoting a rise in crimes against properey. 
Total property crime (o'r, at least, the rate of property crime, 
based on total population) fell. During the twentieth century, we 
suggest, policing continued to exert its negative effect, but at 
some point the countervailing factors actually countervailed; total 
property crime began to rise. 
Think back, however, to the distinction between total 
and recorded crime. Our arguments imply a different trend for 
recorded crime. We expect efficient policing to have a more 
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rapid effect on the visibility of crime than on its overall fre- 
quency. For the nineteenth century, when the efficiency of policing 
is going up and the real frequency of property crime is going down, 
we expect to find two phases: 1) a dramatic rise in recorded prop- 
erty crime, due to a rapid increase in the proportion of total prop- 
erty crime made visible by policing, 2) a gradual decline in recorded 
property crime, due to the longer-run effects of policing on criminal 
behavior. Obviously, the -argument%: we have laid out anticipate a 
third phase: 3) rising recorded property crime, as policing expands 
more slowly than the other factors affecting property crime and those . 
other factors do their work. In this paper, we neglect the third 
phase and deal mainly with the nineteenth century. 
Although most of the points we have made in this introduction 
are already lodged in one part or another of criminiology, two of 
our notions are implausible at first sight. One is the large 
weight we attribute to policing in the control of property crime. 
The other is our assertion that the frequency--or at least the rate-- 
of property crime actually went down during that nineteenth century 
in which so many western authorities felt they were besieged by 
thieves and ne'er-do-wells. We will devote the rest of our essay 
to making those two notions more plausible. Our method will be 
simply to sketch the evolution of policing in four western countries-- 
Canada, the United States, England and France--review trends in 
recorded crime in those countries, then discuss the links between 
policing and criminal trends in each case. 
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The emphasis i n  t h e  s e c t i o n s  which fo l low and t h e  d a t a  
on which they  draw v a r y  w i t h  t h e  approach of t h e  f o u r - a u t h o r s  and 
w i t h  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of evidence f o r  each country. We have 
t r i e d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  i nc lude  comparable d a t a  on p rope r ty  crime 
r a t e s  f o r  each count ry  beginning wi th  t h e  e a r l i e s t  d a t e  a t  which ' 
a cont inuous s e r i e s  becomes a v a i l a b l e .  For easy r e f e r e n c e  t h e s e  
s e r i e s  have been p l aced  i n  appendices a t  t h e  end of t h i s  chap te r .  
Canada 
P o l i c i n g  i n  Canada is  c a r r i e d  on at t h r e e  l e v e l s :  n a t i o n a l ,  
p r o v i n c i a l  and municipal .  The Royal Canadian Mounted P o l i c e  
(R.C.M.P.) i s  t h e  f e d e r a l  p o l i c e  f o r c e  which a l s o  a c t s  a s  pro- 
v i n c i a l  p o l i c e  i n  a number of provinces  and as municipal  p o l i c e  
where t h e r e  i s  no such f o r c e .  P rov inc i a l  p o l i c e  f o r c e s  such a s  
t h e  Ontar io  P r o v i n c i a l  P o l i c e ,  Quebec P r o v i n c i a l  P o l i c e  g e n e r a l l y  
rep laced  t h e  r u r a l  cons tabulary ;  a11 a r e a s  o u t s i d e  t h e  c o n t r o l  
of municipal  p o l i c e  f o r c e s  f a l l  w i th in  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  of t h e  
r e s p e c t i v e  p r o v i n c i a l  p o l i c e .  
The p o l i c i n g  of c i t i e s  and towns i s  mainly a yesponsl- 
b i l i t y  of Municipal p o l i c e  f o r c e s ,  which c o n s t i t u t e  54 percent  
of t h e  t o t a l  f o r c e s  (23,969 out  of 43,762 i n  1971) i n  Canada. 
The R.C.M.P. i s  t h e  o t h e r  major fo rce :  25 percent  of t h e  t o t a l  
(10,960). Under d i r e c t  c o n t r o l  of t h e  Min i s t e r  of J u s t i c e ,  t h e  
R.C.M.P. i s  headed by a commissioner s t a t i o n e d  i n  O t t a w a .  The 
rest of t h e  f o r c e s  i n c l u d e  t h e  Ontar io  P rov inc i a l  P o l i c e ,  t h e  
Quebec P r o v i n c i a l  P o l i c e  and o the r  s p e c i a l  f o r c e s  such a s  
Canadian Nat iona l  Railway, Canadian P a c i f i c  Railway and t h e  
Nat iona l  Harbours Board Po l i ce .  
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Besides these full-time police forces a large body of 
security guards ( veryoften uniformed, trained and full-time 
paid) exist to watch business places, plazas, buildings. Their 
jurisdictions are limited, they are not part of the full-time 
police forces, and they do not want to be known as such. 
While the jurisdiction of the R.C.M.P. extends to the 
entire country to enforce laws made by the Canadian Parliament, 
assist departments of the Government of Canada whenever neces- 
sary, and maintain security and intelligence services, the 
jurisdictions of provincial forces are limited to their respec- 
tive provinces; they mainly enforce laws in rural areas without 
municipal police forces of their own. All cities are responsible 
for maintaining their own forces. 
From 1873, when the Northwest Mounted Police force was 
inaugurated, annual reports of the force were published.regular1y. 
The reports provide information about the activities.of.the 
force and crimes within its geographical jurisdiction. Turner's 
(1950) chronological history of the force is mainly.based on 
these reports; it sums up the activities of the force from 
1873 to 1889. In the meantime upper and lower Canada were po- 
liced by the Dominion Police, which was amalgamated with the 
R.C.M.P. in 1920. For lack of data about the Dominion Police, 
we are limiting our discussion of federal policing to the R.C.M.P. 
We can trade the emergence of police in Canada back to 
the Police Ordinance of 1839; it was similar to the London 
Police Act, which empowered the government to raise both mounted 
and foot constables. In 1845, after a workers' disorder at the 
Welland and St. Lawrence canal, another act authorized the Governor in 
Council to raise "a body of men not exceeding 100 exclusive officers 
and to be called the-'Mounted Police'." There is evidence that such a 
police force was raised. (Under Captain John Wheeler, the force acted 
in a riot at Thorold.) In 1849, the government raised the Mounted 
Constabulary Force, consisting of 50 men, mainly to protect parliament 
and other public buildings. 
There were other political circumstances which inspired the 
Canadian government to create a federal police force. The Canadian 
Rebellion of 1837-38, the invasion of Canadian territory by the 
Patriots in 1838 and the further invasion by the gnians in the 1860s 
all claimed to liberate Canade from the overseas empire. During the 
period of Fenian raids a sort of secret police was created to uncover 
plots against British America and take action against them. 'FYnally, 
the act of 1868 gave birth to the>Dbminion Police under the supervision 
of judges. In November 1860 its jurisdiction was extended to the 
whole Dominion of Canada with two connnissioners of police for Ontario 
and Quebec. ' It is hard to estimate the size of this force. There 
were at least 15 men in Ottawa to protect parliament and other govern- 
ment buildings. How many more were in the rest of Ontario and Quebec,. 
we don't know. The number, however, was very small.' According to 
one source (N.W.M.P. Report 1920) the size of the Dominion Police 
force in 1880 was 20; it gradually increased to 150 in 1920. 
When the N.W.M.P. started in 1873, 150 men arrived in Winnipeg 
with the'manifest function of coercing the'outlaws and whisky traders. 
It was estimated that there were 500 whisky traders in the area who 
had underground hideouts. &year later more men were recruited in 
.Toronto and.on June 6, 1874, 16 officers, 201 men and.244 horses-left 
by two trains. Occupational backgrounds of 174 sub-constables reflect 
the militaristic character of the force. There were 41 from regular 
services, 14 from the Royal Irish Constabulary and civil forces, 32 
from the Canadian Artillery, 87 from the Canadian militia (Report 
1874: 33) .  
The organizational hierarchy under the Department-of -the 
Secretary of State, constituted a Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, 
Surgeons, Veterinary Surgeon, Quarter-master, Inspectors, Sub-Inspector, 
Constables and Sub-constables. The force had a wide - range of duties 
I 
! and privileges which included 'the preservation of peace, the preven- 
tion of crime and offences against the laws and ordinances in force, 
the apprehension of criminals and offenders, the attendance upon 
court officers when required, the execution of warrants and performance 
of all duties related thereto, the escort and conveyance of prisoners 
or lunatics to places of punishment or confinement, and performance 
of all duties assigned under the authority of the Act, with all the 
power, authority, protection and privileges which any constable might 
be clothed with under the law.' (Turner 1950: 89) Thus the N.W.M.P. 
was a police force under military discipline. 
- - - - - - - - - -  
Table 1 About Here 
- - - - - - - - , - -  
-The size of the force leveled off in the next three years. 
The total strength in 1877 was 329, and in 1881, 293. It may be , 
recalled here that during this period American settlers, in a drive 
to exterminate Indians, were pushing them into Canadian territory. 
I 
American Sioux.Indians, about 700 in number, mixed Sioux, Angallala, 
Table  1 
S i z e  o f  t h e  Royal Canadran-Mounted P o l i c e  Force ,  1876-1971 
S i z e  o f  the Force  
Sources:  
Est. pop. ' l n ' 0 0 0 ' a  
1 )  North  West Mounted P o l i c e  R e p o r t s  1876-1930 and 
Royal Canadian Mounted P o l i c e  R e p o r t s  1931- 
2) H i s t o r i c a l  S t a t i s t i c s  p. 655. 
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Minnecougoos , Uncapapa, Blackfeet , Saw Jac , and T&-~et tles numbering 
500 men, 1000 women, 1,400 children, 3,500 horses crossed borders 
(Report 1876). The N.W.M.P. had a tactical alliance with Blackfeet 
and used other means such as mitigating the sentences.of Assiniboine 
Indian young men in gaol in an effort to persuade them to conform to 
the Queen's law. The Assistant Commissioner's letter (Report 1877, 
Appendix F: 53) is an example of how well the job he.thought the 
force was doing of taming the Indian. The native population was under 
strict surveillance. The frequency with which Indian names appear in 
the lists of.crimina1 cases tried during the early years shows a high 
rate of apprehension of persons of Indian origin. The number-of 
criminal cases handled by the force was small; the most frequent offenses 
appear to be theft of horses, bringing intoxicating liquor, firing, 
assault, and..using firearms in threatening manner. 
After 1885, a complete line of outposts was established, and 
the system of patrol began. This reduced smuggling and horse stealing. 
The next five years are again characterized by a generalized feeling 
of remarkable absence of crime, especially serious crime. Until 1905 
the N.W. Territories were administered by the department of justice. 
When Laurier's government carved out Alberta and Saskatchewan-the . 
administrative responsibility was given to provincial Attorneys 
General. During 1916-1918 the policing of the provinces was with- 
drawn, but in 1918 the jurisdiction of the force was extended to 
include the whole.of Western Canada. At this point the authorized 
strength was fixed at 1,200 men which in the following year was 
increased to 2,500. The duties of the force were defined to include: 




a. The enforcement of Federal Laws 
b. The patrolling and protection of the international 
boundary line 
c. The enforcement of all orders of Council passed under the 
War Measures Act, for protection of public safety 
d. Generally to aid and assist civil power in-preservation 
of law and order whenever the government of Canada may 
direct. 
By the Act of November, 1919 the force was called the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police. The act provided for the absorption of the Dominion 
Police. 
By 1921 the force was handling 8,235 investigative cases per 
year in addition to violations of Criminal Code and Federal Statues. 
During this period, however, the size of the force did not increase; 
consequently the number of cases per force increased significantly: 
from 7 in 1920 to 34 in 1926. Offenses against persons in general 
and homicide in particular were high in 1929. The total number of 
cases (81,735) as well as criminal code offenses (9,650) were far 
too many as compared with the figures of previous years, and the 
overall reported crime remained high, though it went down in thesthirties. 
Municipal Policing - in Canada 
In Canada, by far the most important agencies of administra- 
tion of law and order were municipal police forces of Canada. During 
the years of French rule (1600-1760) there were no local governments; 
when the British took over, the military played an important role in 
governing the country. (Crawford 1954: 20) From 1764, the Courts of 
Quarter Session were the major administrative bodies which controlled 
almost all municipal affairs. The members of the Courts.of Quarter 
Session also constituted a judicial body which tried.various types of 
minor offences and assumed full power to govern cities and town. There 
were instances where municipalities were allowed to elect some officers 
(baillis and sous baillis) to look after highways and bridges, and act 
as constables. However., constables were generally appointed by the 
Court of Quarter Sessions, and parishes were controlled through militia 
to 1841. (Crawford 1954: 31) The policing powers of the courts of 
Quarter Sessions were rather vaguely and generally defined, but they 
were authorized to make order and regulation to administer cities and 
towns. 
- In the late eighteenth century immigration tremendously increased 
when thousands of loyalists moved to Canada; about 10,000 settled in 
Ontario. During the first half of the nineteenth century upper Canada 
experienced as high as a 10-11 percent increase in some years. 
The increase in population was f a m e d  by and then accompanied 
the growth of urban centers, creating a need for expedient government 
structure. The multifarious problems of cities further multiplied. 
The Courts of Quarter Session though enjoying increased powers'to manage 
city affairs were becoming incapable to cope with the situation for 
the same reason. Courts of Quarter Session not only failed to handle 
everyday problems of the towns and cities but also exhibited indifference 
and lack of understanding of local needs thereby creating distrust 
.& 
and dissatisfaction among the people. 
"A body of public officers with such large and unrestricted 
powers would not be considered somewhat dangerous, even if its members 
were annually subject to popular election. But the magistrate who 
exercised these enormous powers in Quarter Sessions were life appoin- 
tees of the Government, and often had very meagre qualifications for 
public office. Many of them were old army officers, and most of them 
men of sufficient income to render them indifferent to the hardships 
and wants of the average hard working settler." (McEvoy, "The 
Ontario Township" in Crawford 1954: 27) 
The growing complexities of urban affairs and increasing 
demand for efficient city and town administration were among the 
factors which lead to the creating of full-time urban police forces. 
The beginning of city policing can be traced back to the existence 
of police towns of York, Sandwich and Amherstburg in 1817, and Niagara 
in 1819. (Aitchison 1953: 553). The police town meant a town having 
police establishment by law. (Aitchison 1953: 553). 
Policing was quite welcome in the 1830fs, and preferred over 
corporations. That sentiment is expressed in the following quote from 
a resident of York in 1829. 
"The police system of this town is infamous to a 
certainty, but corrupt and deficient as it is, it 
is still preferable to a Corporation chiefly com- 
posed of, and directed by the reptile band of 
officials of Little York." (Aitchison 1953: 580) 
But nevertheless the writer goes on to suggest: 
"Let the inhabitants go to work and insist on an 
amendment in the present police law, let them call 
a public meeting, and get up a petition to the 
Legislature praying for an act to authorize them 
to elect, by ballot, the whole of their police 
officers annually, and let them suggest to the 
Legislature such other improvements in the pre- 
sent system as the experience of many years has 
shown to be necessary." (Aitchison 1953: 580) 
The formation of a Board of Police in Brockville.in 1832 
marked the beginning of separation of policing power from the Courts 
of Quarter Session. By 1837 the Board of Police were established in 
eight cities in Upper Canada, Hamilton (1833), Cornwall, Port Hope, 
Prescott, and Belleville (1834), Coburg and Picton (1837). (Crawford 
1954: 28) The power of the Brockville Act exemplifies the power 
granted to these boards wfth slight variations. 1 
Policing Recorded Crime 
Before 1876 records about crime statistics are fragmentary 
2 
and scattered. It is very difficult to estimate even roughly the 
extent of criminality in pre-confederation Canada. One can get some 
idea about the extent of criminality reading anecdotal accounts and 
complaints about social conditions and social life in Canada. 
(Clark 1965; Elliot 1930; Guillet 1933). But it is very difficult to 
make generalizations on the basis of these accounts. 
Writing around 1851 one author notes: 
"Serious criminal offenses, especially against pro- 
perty may be said to be comparatively rare in Canada. 
The large amount of material comfort afforded to the 
wide-spread population of the colony, with exceptions, 
mostly in large towns, allows, of course, fewer tempta- 
tions to commit offences against property than among 
the over dense and too frequently starving masses of 
the parent country. " 
(J.B. Brown, Views of Canada and the Colonists in Clark 1942: 240). 
It can be argued that rural communities offered very little to thieves 
and burglars. Their movable property was useless and not worth the 
efforts involved in stealing, and their assets (land) could not be 
stolen. 
A few years earlier (in 1846) pointing out a large number of 
persons in Kingston Penitentiary (520) when the population of Upper 
Canada was very small another author wrote: 
"It will surprise my readers to state that in an 
agricultural country where the manners of people 
are still very primitive, where education is still 
backward, and civilization slowly advancing, out of 
a population of 1,200,000, scattered in the woods, 
there should be so large a proportion as twenty 
women, and five hundred men, in the Kingston Pen- 
itentiary ..." 
(R.H. Bunnycastle in Clark 1942). 
He then cites the instances of crime in cities like Montreal, 
Kingston, and Toronto suggesting a high occurrence of.crime .in cities. 
A few years later, the Preliminary Report of the Board of Inspectors 
of Asylum, Prison etc., (1859) further substantiated the belief that 
there was high incidence of aiminality in cities. Having pointed out 
that a number of towns in lower and upper Canada did not send a single 
convict to the penitentiary, indicating an absence of serious crime in 
those places, the report goes on to say: 
"As a melancholy reverse to this picture, take the 
following cities and environs which seem to monop- 
olize great crimes: Hamilton has sent 35 convicts, 
Toronto 34, and Montreal 26, to the Penitentiary." 
(Sessional Papers of the Province of Canada, 1960, in Clark 1942). 
The above Report also gives some number of convicts.in the Pro-' 
vincial Penitentiary from 1836 10 1859 comparing Canada West and 
Canada East (mekning upper and lower Canada). Figures for Canada 
West are significantly higher (194,179, 238,226 for the years from 
1856 to 1859) than those for Canada East for the same years (80, 49, 
67, 30). It was pointed out that high incidence of crime in upper 
Canada was partly due to high rate of increase in population and 
partly due to habits of drinking. On the basis of the kind of infor- 
mation reported above it can be cautiously inferred that the inci- 
dence of criminality was quite high. However, it is hard to establish 
the extent of various types of crimes. 
The lack of available statistics on crime for the early period 
and for different types of comunities restricts our analysis to the 
late 19th century and .to national lev'el trends. We have selected two 
kinds of indicators to examine the trends in criminality. First, the 
.. . 
number and rate of all coriiictions (indictable and nonindictable) 
covering the period of 1876 to 1921; second, the number and roles of 
conviction for all indictable offences, to see if there appears any 
significant difference in the trends when nonindictable offences are 
excluded. The second set of data cover the period between 1886-1921. 
In both sets we have examined four categdes of crimes, namely, offences 
against the person, offences against property with violence, offences 
. 
against property without violence, and total of 'all offenses. ,3 
- - - - - - - - - -  
Figure  1 About Here 
- - - - - - - - - -  
The r a t e s  of conv ic t ion  f o r  t h e  type ' a l l  o f f ences '  r e g i s t e r e d  a  
v i s i b l e  d e c l i n e  dur ing  t h e  f i r s t  decade (1876-1887), a slow r i s e  
t ill  t h e  t u r n  of t h e  century ,  and a  s t e e p  i n c r e a s e  a f t e r  1902. 
The r a t e s  of eonvfctfon f o r  "offences a g a i n s t  p rope r ty  wi thout  
v io lence"  show a t r end  very  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  one shown by " a l l  
o f fences ,"  t h a t  i s ,  an o v e r a l l  slow d e c l i n e  t o  1887, a slow i n c r e a s e  
t u r n i n g  i n t o  a  s t e e p e r  s lope  a f t e r  1900. The conv ic t ion  r a t e s  f o r  
o f f ences  a g a i n s t  t h e  person can be descr ibed  i n  t h e  same f a sh ion ,  
bu t  o f f ences  a g a i n s t  p roper ty  wi th  v io l ence  do n o t  e x h i b i t  a  t r end  
comparable t o  t h e  o t h e r  types of of fences .  
Let  us  t u r n  our  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  s t a t i s t i c s  on conv ic t ions  
f o r  t h e  second ca tegory  of d a t a  ( i n d i c t a b l e  o f f ences  o n l y ) .  
Very l i k e l y  t h e  i n d i c t a b l e  of fences  of v a r i o u s  types ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
o f f ences  a g a i n s t  p rope r ty  without  v io lence  r e g i s t e r e d  a  d e c l i n e  be fo re  
1887 which eontfnued dur ing  1886 and 1887. But w e  cannot d e f i n i t e l y  
say  s o  i n  t h e  absence of t h i s  type of in format ion  f o r  t h e  yea r s  
1876-1885. Since 1887 t h e  r a t e s  of conv ic t ions  f o r  o f f ences  a g a i n s t  
p rope r ty  w i t h ~ u t . ~ i o l e n c e  and against .  t h e  person show a slow i n c r e a s e ,  
becoming f a s t e r  a f t e r  1900 than before .  The r a t e s  of conv ic t ions  f o r  
i n d i c t a b l e  o f f ences  a l s o  e x h i b i t  a  slow i n c r e a s e  dur ing  t h e  same per iod .  
These i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  va r ious  types of i n d i c t a b l e  o f f ences  are i n  t u r n  
r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  c o m ~ a r a b l e  manner i n  t h e  t r end  f o r  ' a l l  i n d i c t a b l e  
\ 
of fences . '  
- - - - - - - - - -  
Figure  2 About Here 
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When we look a t  t h e  t rend  i n  conv ic t ion  r a t e s  f o r  v a r i o u s . t y p e s  of 
i n d i c t a b l e  of fences  beyond 1921, ic is  observed t h a t  both types  of 
o f f ences  a g a i n s t  p roper ty  (with and wi thout  v io l ence )  gradual ly  
i nc reased  t o  1931, r e g i s t e r i n g  r e l a t i v e l y  ve ry  h igh  r a t e s  from 
1926 t o  1931, and showing a  downward t r end  a f t e r  193l, .which i s  
reversed  near  t h e  1950's.  These t r e n d s  do not  n e a t l y  match wi th  our 
f i n d i n g  about o t h e r  s o c i e t i e s  s t u d i e d  h e r e  and our  prev ious  research .  
Another p o i n t  which may be recorded h e r e  i s  t h i s :  t h e  
percentage  of conv ic t ions  i s  f o r  o f f e n s e s  a g a i n s t  p roper ty  without  
v io l ence ,  which g radua l ly  dec l ined  from 60 t o  64% of t h e  t o t a l  i n d i c t -  
a b l e  crimes i n  t h e  e a r l y  per iod  t o  about  36% i n  t h e  1940's.  Other 
c a t e g o r i e s  of c r i m i n a l i t y  were i n c r e a s i n g  a t  a  much f a s t e r  r a t e  than 
p rope r ty  crimes. Offenses a g a i n s t  p rope r ty  wi th  v io lence  inc rease  
from 7.6 percent  t o  13.5 percent  i n  t h e  1920's ;  they s t a b i l i z e d  a t  
12-13% i n  1940's.  The b igges t  i n c r e a s e  i n  percentage was r e g i s t e r e d  
i n  "o ther  of fenses"  from a low of around 4% i n  t h e  1890's. The per- 
cen tage  increased  t o  30 t o  36 i n  t h e  1940's .  
This  is  an i n t e r e s t i n g  obse rva t ion  from two angles .  F i r s t ,  
i t  sugges t s  t h a t  law enforcement agencies  are busy t ak ing  c a r e  of a l l  
types  of o t h e r  o f f enses  whi le  o f f enses  a g a i n s t  p roper ty  a r e  a l s o  
inc reas ing .  Second, i t  draws our  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  f a c t , t h a t  t h e  
h c r e a s e  i n  t o t a l  c r imina l  o f f enses  does n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e f l e c t  a 
t r u e  i n c r e a s e  i n  c r i m i n a l i t y ;  new d e f i n i t i o n s  and s h i f t s  i n  t h e  range 
of behavior  aga ins t  which law enforcement agencies  a r e  empowered t o  
a c t  a r e  cont inuously be ing  made. 
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Policing -- and the Visibility of Canadian Crime -
On the face of it, Canada is not an encouraging case for our 
argument. The shortage of evidence on nineteenth-century policing 
and criminality, especially before 1867, leaves many questions moot. 
And the long-run trend of the major criminal categories is unquestion- 
ably upward. The problem, of course, is to know whether that means 
a) our argumenr is incorrect: policfng did not tend to deter prop- 
erty crime in Canada or b) our argument is correct, but the effects 
of policing on the "true" prevalence of property crime were masked by 
contrary effects: by the impact of policing on the visibility of 
crime and by the influence of the increasing availability and desir- 
ability of property on the "true" prevalence of property crime. 
A few pieces of the evidence lend themselves to our argument. 
The anecdotal history of the Canadian frontier portrays the unpoliced 
areas as alive with crime. With the inauguration of federal policing 
in the North-west Territories, by contrast, we hear about the remark- 
able absence of serious crime in the police districts. Indeed, we 
find some indications of declines in major crimes during the first 
segment of the official statistics, the 1860s and 1870s. Further- 
more, we find property crimes with violence rising little after 1886, 
and property crimes without violence rising less than most other 
classes of offences. 
Nevertheless, if evidence for other countries, or further 
evidence for Canada, ran in the same direction we would have to 
concede defeat. On the Canadian evidence, either our argument is 
wrong, or our argument is unverifiable. Let us see, then, whether 
the same conclusion emerges from the study of the'U.S., England 
and France. 
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The Pattern of Police Development in the United States - -
At the creation of the United States as a nation in 1776, 
the foundations were laid for the most decentralized policing arrange- 
ments of any sovereign state. By the early decades of the nineteenth 
century, it was established that policing would be a matter for local 
authorities: state governors ceded some of the rights of their 
colonial predecessors to wield police power to the municipalities, from 
where it was further devolved to city alderman at the ward level. Male 
suffrage came early in the United States, and for some decades voters 
had a direct say in who would be their police officials. This localized 
and democratic pattern for establishing police authorities was followed 
as the frontier moved west, years after the original pattern ceased to 
exist in the eastern cities. In contrast to Canada, where government 
in the form of the Northwest Mounted Police, often preceded settlement, 
in the United States, settlement preceded government. On the frontier, 
disputes over who should maintain what sort of order were frequent and 
vigilante committees challenged the elected officials (see Brown 1969). 
But neither the state nor the Federal governments intervened in these 
clashes. The criminal justice system of the United States, though 
ultimately the creature of a Federal constitution, and answerable to 
Federal power and judicial overview, began on a basis of localized 
accountability. The major consequence of this pattern, of legendary 
knowledge, is that public police officials were closely connected to 
the political life in their communities. Professionalism had to contend 
with politicization. 
There is another consequence of some importance to the present 
analysis. A decentralized police system provided no central concern 
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with uniform police practices, and no one repository of-information 
about crime across the society. At the present stage of research into 
the nineteenth century American police, the student must examine 
discrete police units at Federal, State, County or Municipal level. 
The most readily accessible data derive from the cities where continuous 
records were maintained--though all do not survive--after the establish- 
ment of the police departments around the middle of the century. These 
records are used to test the thesis of this paper. But it is possible 
nevertheless to sketch the broad outlines of development for each of 
the other police types. 
Though in the beginning police power was a large matter for 
small units of government, and a small concern of larger jurisdictions, 
the trend in the United States was for higher levels of government to 
assume a greater police role. But the lesser units have not gone out 
of the policing business:- all have grown, differentially. Centrali- 
zation has had significant limits in the United States, and the trend 
proceeded very slowly in the nineteenth century. The early reluctance 
of powerful Americans to have State and Federal governments undertake 
police work led to a major deviation in the United States from the 
police development pattern elsewhere. This was the emergence and 
vigorous growth of private police agencies. By the end of the nine- 
teenth century they were numerically a close second to the public 
police departments in the cities, but they dominated in many of the 
counties. Some private police work of the nineteenth century came 
to be tackled by State and Federal governments in the twentieth 
century. We will trace this development presently. The more general 
point to be made first is that in the United States, unlike other 
equally capitalist nations wich different political structures, police 
power and protection was not only decentralized to small polities, but 
localized directly to wealthy individuals and corporate-groups. 
Federal and state police power in the nineteenth-century was 
seldom directed at everyday crime. Mostly it was exercised by military 
and militia units as a backstop in civil disturbances and against the 
Indians; it was used frequently in the South during reconstruction, and 
in the North and West for industrial strikes and race riots later in 
4 the century. Our concern here is with policing and ordinary crime, 
so we will just briefly consider policing by the larger units of govern- 
ment, and then say more about the two dominant police forms: the 
private agencies and the municipal police departments. 
Federal Police 
5 
In the 19th century several small spcial-purpose police units 
were established by the Federal Government to enforce and protect 
Congressional fiscal operations and the mail; a large part of the 
r 
effort went into internal surveillance of officials. Policing the 
operations of large organizations turned out to be a significant 
task in the nineteenth century, since adequate accounting systems had 
not yet been developed. Policing was often undertaken by private 
police for governments at all levels, and extensively for big firms 
such as railroads. The Federal government used both its own forces, 
and private agencies on contract. 
The Treasury Department set up four units before 1900. The 
Revenue Cutter Service, which became the Coast Guard in 1915, was 
organized in 1789 and grew steadily; by the end of the century it had 
seventy agentsin an Intelligence Division. The Customs Agency Service, 
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which was established in 1846 to investigate customs officials 
consisted of 90 agents by 1900. After the Civil War, the-Secret 
Service and the Bureau of Internal Revenue were added to Treasury. 
The former was a mulct-purpose detective organization which dealt 
initially with counterfeiting but soon was used by various government 
departments. The modern role of protecting the President was not 
assumed until 1902, after the assassination of President McKinley. 
Then the force was still fewer than one hundred agents. The Bureau 
of Internal Revenue began to employ agents to deal with frauds and 
evasions only after Federal taxes were again levied in 1861. There 
were twenty-five agents at the end of the 1860's and not more than 
one hundred by 1900. 
The Post Office was the other Federal Department employing 
police. A Special Branch was set up in 1840, with thirty-three 
agents in 1865, nfnety in 1880 and more than one hundred two decades 
later. Federal Marshals were important along the frontier in the 
nineteenth century, but we have no information about their numbers. 
The job was often part of a political rather than a police career 
and for that reason we are not treating it as part of the professional- 
izing police, All other police units of the Federal government are 
twentieth century creations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
for example, was begun in 1909--with six agents! 
State Police 
6 
Most police organizations at this level were also largely 
begun in the early decades of this century. They emerged in the 
heavily industrialized areas of the northeast: Connecticut in 1904, 
Pennsylvania in 1905, New York, Michigan, New Jersey, West Virginia 
and others in 1917. These police departments represented a slow 
and partial response of authorities to the dismal failures of 
various forms of private police and the state militia (both working 
solely for management), and of ineffectual county officials, to 
maintain an equitable order in the factory towns. Though state police 
were extensively used in industrial disputes, the bulk of their day- 
to-day work dealt with crime. 
There had been public pressure in many states to expand the 
police role of the state governments from the middle of the nineteenth 
century, most often initiated by a rd-based party in the state legis- 
lature chalhgfng its opposition which had control in the cities. Police 
power had been granted co the cities earlier in the century, but it 
could always be taken back. For two or three decades in states with 
sizable cities, the "farmer" representatives won out: city police 
departments were made accountable to state-appointed Boards of Police 
Commissioners. But this development neither much affected the nature 
of city police work, nor did it lead to additional public policing 
outside the cities, except in New England. 
Separate state police organizations were established in Texas, 
mine, New Hampshire and Massachusetts. The Texas Rangers, which grew 
out of vigilante groups of settlers acting against Indians and Mexicans, 
had a checkered but continuous life from 1835, numbering 140 men at 
one time but down to eightyin 1901. The New England state constabu- 
laries were smaller and different in initial purpose. Massachusetts, 
the largest, came to life in 1870 to enforce state liquor laws and 
some regulations governing health and safety conditions in factories. 
But all increasingly engaged in criminal work. In 1891, for example, 
Massachusetts employed twenty-five factory inspectors and.twelve detec- 
\ 
tives, the latter made less than five hundred arrests.across the state 
for a wide range of standard criminal offenses. 
County Police 
7 
The old English offices of Sheriff and Constable-continued in 
the United States. They were the central police roles of the countl.es 
in the nineteenth century. Each was used for both civil and criminal 
work, and paid for largely on a fee-for-service basis. The Sheriff 
possessed the power to command the "posse comitas", that is, to call 
to his assistance citizens over the age of fifteen years. He could 
deputize these citizens with police power--an important mechanism 
for creating private police. It is unlikely that many county sheriffs 
in the nineteenth century could be considered professional police, 
in the sense in which that term is used here. Under.a fee system, 
the civil work was both more time-consuming and profitable than the 
criminal. Further, the office of sheriff being elective, it was often 
a temporary (and on occasion, lucrative) stopover in a political 
career. 
If we accept that the counties provided no professional police 
in the nineteenth century, that the Federal and State governments 
accounted for at most six hundred police professionals operating in 
limited jurisdictions, then policing the sixty-three million Americans 
who existed in 1900, was a task for the city and the private police. 
The city departments were also restricted to operate in their communi- 
ties of accountability. Most of the "criminal space" in between was 
handled by the private agencies. But first, the municipalities. 
City Police 
8 
The old American cit\ies on the eastern seaboard had had a 
citizen night watch since colonial times. They also had sheriffs 
and constables who consrituted the day police, working from courts 
for fees. Watchmen had at first been drafted, or took-their turn, 
and were unpaid. By 1800 they were paid on a nightly basis, though a 
tour of duty varied across cities from a few weeks to one year. 
Watchmen were entitled to earn fees for arrests made, but few chose 
to leave their trades in order to appear at court. The-watch-system, 
increasingly ineffective for the frequent early nineteenth century 
kinds of disorder--especially property crimes and riots--yet increas- 
ingly costly to the taxpayer, continued in the East until police 
departments, at first called day and night watch, were established. 
In the United States, the model of the London Metropolitan Police 
was an organizational invention, early discussed after 1829, and 
available for dissemination when the political and administrative 
conditions were right. Philadelphia tried a short-lived experiment 
with the form in the 18301s, paid for by a city benefactor. But 
the model, much modified, was first laid out in New York in 1845. 
Other cities, of greatly different size and composition, followed in 
the 1850fs, consolidating a distinctive American institution. 
The new pattern incorporated at least two important features 
of the nineteenth-century watch system. The first is the systematic 
deployment of watchmen across the city space, often from ward-located 
watch-houses. Though centrally directed for some kinds of incidents 
under a Captain of the Match, or equivalent, the watch was based in 
wards. As new wards were founded, men living in those districts were 
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added to the watch. The second feature of the watch which found its 
way into the police departments was the localized political account- 
ability. Broadly speaking nineteenth century watchmen were appointed 
by, and made accountable to, the city councilmen elected from the wards. 
The new police departments were made accountable to the Mayor who was 
legally responsible for appointments. But in fact he acted on sugges- 
tions of the wardmen who most often recommended on the basis of patron- 
age. Thus the police officials in the cities were highly politicized 
from the outset. 
The citizen watch then, provided one progenitor of professional 
police in the United States. What of the others? The office of Sheriff 
continued in the county where a city was located, but became of 
decreasing importance to criminal work. This was assumed during the 
watch era by constables; in some cities, criminal work fell to 
Marshals and, simply, Day Police. We shall refer to the constable - 
role, meaning any of these. It will be recalled that these officials 
worked primarily for fees paid at court for civil and criminal work-- 
writs delivered, witnesses gathered, arrests made and the like. Two 
developments combined, as the cities grew, to make the constables 
into entrepreneurial and professional police officials. First, 
possible remuneration for the work increased considerably, not only 
from fees, but also from rewards offered for the recovery of stolen 
property. Public constables were entitled by law to receive rewards. 
They were also allowed to be paid for guarding a bank or for watching 
warehouses. The second development both follows from the first and 
arises from the decentraliza'tion of the political system. The 
canstables became diffusely accountable. The degree of diffuseness 
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of political control over constables, varied from city to city. That 
is to say, the number of official and other citizens who had some 
voice in the appointment, supervision and payment of constables was 
larger in some cities than in others. Centralized co-ordination of 
the work also varied; it was rae~gvery strong. But in all cities, as 
the century advanced, the constable both worked for more public 
officials than previously--mayor, alderman, high constable, city 
attorney, police court and other judges--and could be hired by, or 
could respond to reward offers from, a growing number of banks, firms 
and individuals who wanted property protected or recovered. Under 
these conditions, incumbents of the constable role tended to stay on 
the job--a career was possible and thus the role was professionalized-- 
and to compete among each other for information about crime and 
remuneration. 
The new police departments centralized all police officials, 
watchmen and constables,.into the one organization, and made rules to 
prevent members from receiving outside remuneration. Thus, in law at 
least, they ended the entrepreneurial aspect of the public police role. 
Criticism of the constables had mounted during the 1830's and 1840's 
as people saw and felt the inequities of the entrepreneurial system. 
It was alleged, among other things: that people were unfairly 
arrested for the sake of fees; that deals were made with theives for 
the rewards on recovering stolen property and the thieves allowed to 
go free because the reward was much more than the fee for making an 
arrest; and that constables, absorbed in private work, did not attend 
efficiently to important public protection work such as at riots and 
fires. An early attempt to ensure more public work by the.constables, 

Mr. Du Breuil, late first lieutenant in the same, have 
established an independent police. They have been 
constituted deputies by a legal officer, and have quali- 
fied according to the requirements of law, and are, 
therefore, fully authorized to act as peace officers, 
and to execute any process issued in any criminal 
case. Of course they will receive no salary, and 
their compensation will often depend on what those 
who choose to employ them shall think proper. This . 
kind of police has been tried in all of the Eastern 
cities ..... and has been found to be much more 
efficient than that of the regularly appointed officers.' 
10 
St. Louis June 5, 1846 
Here -is the prototypical account of the origins of the private 
police agencies. The mechanism of legitimation is the deputization 
of a citizen by a suitable officfal. This is a public police power, 
but it will be available for private purposes. The agent has 
previously established himself in a public police role. The claim 
is made that for those who can afford them the private police will 
be more efficient than the politicized public organizations. 
After the city police departments were established, private 
police had to be licensed. However, the warrants were issued by 
different officials.in different places--the Chief of Police, Police 
Commissioners, the Mayor, the Governor, and of course the ubiquitous 
county Sheriff--and limited records of these appointments appear to 
have survived. We have used the following fragmentary data to indicate 
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trends in the growth of private police in the cities. 1) Records 
of watchmen licensed and private agencies for which warrants were 
issued. 2) United States Senate investigations into private police 
in 1893, the Homestead Inquiry, (U.S. Senate 1883). 3) Some 
incomplete records of the largest private police firm, Pinkertons 
National Police Agency (see Pinkerton files, Library of Contress). 
McDonough and Du Brie1 operated in St. Louis from 1846 
to 1861 when McDonough was made Chief of Police in the newly organ- 
ized police department. The firm may have had a monopoly on detec- 
tive work during che years of entrepreneurial public policing in 
St. Louis, which ended when the department was established. We have 
found no record of long-lived agencies in the "Eastern cities" 
referred to in the newspaper editorial. Agencies probably could not 
survive until they were assured of some regular source of income. 
This was provided first by the larger railroad companies. Such was 
the case for two agencies established in Chicago in the 1850's. 
Allan Pinkerton, a former deputy Sheriff of Cook County, began his 
firm in 1852 with contracts for regular work. Up to this time 
private police were sought by property owners or occupiers, and pay- 
ment was often based on successful results. The agencies sought 
work by advertising and negotiated contracts based on standardized 
per diem rates, regardless of success. By the end of the 1860's 
Pinkerton had branches of his agency in six cities, all added in that 
decade. Though the firm grew in numbers, no new branches were estab- 
lished until the 1890's when four more were begun, making ten in all 
by 1900 with about 800 permanent staff. Greatest expansion occurred 
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in the next decade, with twenty-five branches by 1910, two of which 
were in the Canadian cities of Montreal and Toronto. 
This trend is seen to be paralleled when we examine the 
number of guards and detectives licensed in three cities; Boston, 
St. Louts and San Francisco, and the number of private police 
11 
agencies advertised in Denver. Growth was steady but unspectac- 
ular during the latter half of the nineteenth century; the major 
fluctuations reflected special events such as railroad strikes. 
(There was one in Boston in 1879: 218 agents were appointed as 
railroad police that year, as compared with only 42 the following 
year.) In the 1880s and 1890s, the numbers of private police 
licensed were equivalent to 10% to 30% of the entire police department. 
Denver had two private agencies in 1881, four by 1890 and five during 
the following decade- The big jump in private police numbers occurred 
around 1910: in Boston and San Francisco from 40% to over 60% of 
police department size in about five years; in Denver from five agen- 
cies to nine. St. Louis recorded a temporary increase to 75% of 
police department size in 1904-05 for a world exposition held there in 
those years, although this level did not persist through 1910. The 
figures for private police licensed by police departments underestimate 
the totals, as table 2 indicates. The later nineteenth century, 
therefore, brough a substantial increase--both relatively and absolutely-- 
in private police forces. 
Four main kinds of private police force are discernible through 
the nineteenth century: 
1. Guard and protection work. It consisted of patrolling 
private and public premises, including docks and railroads, or 
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watching and taking tickets at large public events such as races, 
circuses, fairs and expositions, 
2. Detective investigation.. Before the Civil War this was 
concerned principally with robbery, counterfeiting and runaway 
slaves; after the war, crimes against carriers and banks 
expanded. 
3 .  Surveillance of employees. The early work of this type in 
1850s.and 1860s was the single most.important source of regular 
employment for private agencies, especially in the investigation 
of embezzlement by employees of railroads. Many large organiza- 
tions had weak accounting systems. Labor unrest after the Civil 
War led to undercover surveillance of workers in order to break 
up union activity and discredit strikes. The most celebrated 
early case, the Pinkertons' investigation of the Molly Maguires 
in the Pennsylvania coalfields during the early 1870s, is 
widely considered to have given great impetus to this kind of 
work. 
4. Strike-breaking guard work. Typically this was associated 
with undercover surveillance from the 1860's. Pinkertons 
testified at the Homestead Inquiry that they first undertook this 
work in 1866 and again in 1868 and 1874. From that time through 
1892 they had "been employed to protect private property in con- 
nection with seventy strikes--a small percentage of the total 
strikes in the United States in that period." (U.S. Senate 1893). 
Though Pinkerton tried to give a contrary impression, most of the 
men were recruited for strike work on a temporary basis, or drawn 
briefly from routine guard and protection work. 
Table 2 . . 




Detectives - Government 
Policemen and 
Detectives - Private 
Marshals and 
Constables 
Total 116 155 217 302 381 459 . 
Source: Series D 123-572 Detailed Occupation of the Economically 
Active Population, 1900-1950 
~istorical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times 
to 1957. D. 77 U.S. De~artment of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, Washington, D.C. 1961 
Although subsequent analysis may show that the growth of 
private police is associated with a growing frequency of labor strikes 
during the .late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the evidence 
in hand suggests that the bulk of private police in the cities was 
routinely engaged in the protection and recovery of property. 
Pinkertons, for example, had 150 people regularly employed in its 
. 
Chicago branch in 1893; 100 were engaged in guard and protection work 
(though some had gone to Homestead Pennsylvania the year before) and 
50 on detective investigation and labor surveillance work. Information 
from the census indicates also that in 1910, private guards, watchmen 
and doorkeepers provide a substantial addition Lo the police forces 
charged with the protection of property. The figures in Table 1 
further show that the numbers of private police licensed by the police 
departments considerably understate the extent to which the public 
officials are supported by private guards of property. As we shall see 
below in most of the cities examined the parallel growth of private 
police forces accompanies a decline in the rates of arrests for property 
offenses. Though we shall not examine this association as closely as 
that between property arrest rates and the growth of the public police, 
the development of private police is clearly important. 
- - - - - - - - - -  
Table 2 About Here 
- - - - - - - - - -  
The Growth of Policing and Arrest Rates in Nine U.S. Cities 12 
The nine cities are a fair cross-section of the main urban areas 
in the nineteenth century. Four grew from colonial ports on the eastern 
seaboard: Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Charleston. The latter, 
in contrast to the others,. had a large slave population and grew very 
slowly in the 1900's. New Orleans, also a southern slave town, had a 
larger and more diverse white population at the outset, expanding rapidly 
before the Civil War and more slowly thereafter. St. Louis and Chicago 
were two important and ethnically diverse mid-western centers of trans- 
port and industry after mid-century, the latter becoming second in size 
to New York by 1900. St. Louis had a slave population, and developed a 
watch. Chicago, San Francisco, and Denver, never had a citizen watch 
tradition; they began with entrepreneurial public police. In the 
1850's in San ~rancisco; a famous vigilante committee usurped the police 
powers of the elected officials during the entrepreneurial phase. In 
Denver too, a vigilante committee emerged in 1870 prior to a centralized 
police department. 
Except in the case of Boston, information about the number of 
police officials and arrests is available only after the police depart- 
ments are established. Furthermore, the information is not continuous. 
For the purposes of a Iarp study, Levett has coded total arrests into 
the following categories: 
1. offenses against property 
2. offenses against persons 
3. offenses against the police 
4. offenses against public order 
a. on views 
b. vice 
c. domestic 
d. for other agencies 
e. miscellaneous 
Here we shall abstract information on just two of these-categories: 
offenses against property and on-views. The reason for including the 
on-views will become more apparent as we proceed; essentially it is to 
contrast the two main types of police mobilization. For property 
arrests the police are usually mobilized by citizens seeking help; in 
the case of on-views the policeman saw the offense and made the arrest 
without citizen mobilization. 
The property arrests include both serious ones (burglary, 
robbery, receiving stolen goods, embezzlement, counterfeiting) and the 
less serious (shoplifting, petit larceny, malicious mischief). The 
police recorders did not distinguish between felony and misdemeanor. 
Some kinds of infrequent offenses against property were not included: 
principally, pickpodeting (coded on-view) and certain infractions of 
municipal ordinances such as false weights and measures. 
We assume that the property arrests which have been so coded, 
came about after citizens mobilized the police. In other words, the 
volume of property crime which came to the attention of the police was 
not defined as a result of police discretion or initiative, but 
because of citizen calls for help. The centralized police department, 
with patrolmen deployed systematically throughout the city space, 
increased the availability of police assistance. Apart from directly 
approaching a policeman on his beat, or going to the station house to 
report a crime, (both common in the nineteenth centuify), rattles and 
bells were sometimes used by citizens in the early decades. By the 
18601s, city departments had a statioa-to-station telegraph, and uni- 
forms to help identify the patrolmen. A telephone service with call- 
boxes located on city streets was begun in the 1890's. 
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The category on-view arrests, a current police term, captures 
those offenses likely to have been personally observed by the officer 
who then decided to make an arrest. The nineteenth century patrolman 
typically walked along the city streets and was thus in a position to 
see more infractions of laws than his contemporary counterpart who drives 
in an automobile. In our nine cities during the 1900fs, on-view arrests 
comprised between 50% and 80% of the total arrests. In contrast, a 1966 
observational study of police patrol work in three American cities 
reports that just 13% of the incidents counted were on-views (Black 1968, 
Reiss 1971). The difference between police work in the two eras is also 
due to another kind of technology, the telephone. Today in the United 
States, most patrol work arises at the bidding of citizens who telephone 
for help and thereby mobilize the police. Therefore the bulk of con- 
temporary police work is citizen-initiated; for that reason it is called 
reactive policing. In contrast, arrest volume in the nineteenth century 
made up largely of on-views, resulted primarily from proactive policing. 
On-view arrests, then and now, are typically for more trivial 
offenses which occur in public places. Our data consist of four kinds 
of offenses coded as on-view: Drunkenness (by far the most frequent 
source of arrest volume); Disorderly Behavior (e.g. breach of the 
peace, brawling, vulgar language, and the more serious but less fre- 
quent riot, mayhem and discharging of a firearm); Vagrancy (lounging 
and destitution); and Traffic Offenses which, of course, were very 
few until the 1910's. Some important but usually infrequent offenses 
on which the police would have observed and taken the initiative were 
not classified as on-views. These include: 1) offenses against the 
police (attacking or interfering with an officer, rescuing a prisoner 
and the like which were coded separately; except in the South during 
reconstruction this category was always less than 1% of the total 
arrests); 2) some vice offenses (e.g. street-walking and violations of 
licensing laws). The proportion in this category varied across the 
cities and at different points in time. These other police-initiated 
arrests reflect a different impetus for proactive policing that will 
not be taken up here. 
Let us first examine the trends for property arrests and the 
growth of the public police. The contrast with on-views is made in 
the discussion of Boston, below. Four patterns are discernible. 
1. Rates for property arrests decline while relative police 
size increases--Boston, Chicago, San Francisco--Figure 3. 
2. Property arrest rates decline while police size remains 
the same or declines slightly during critical decadesr-New York, 
Denver--Figure 4. 
3. Property arrest rates decline and so does police size-- 
Charleston, New Orleans--Figure 5. 
4 .  Property arrest rates do not decline while police size 
increases--Philadelphia, St. Louis--Figure 6. 
Over-all, there is some support for the hypothesis advanced 
near the beginning of this paper: in the societies under observation 
I 
property crimes would increase at some early stage in the nineteenth 
century and then decline steadily through the remainder of the century. 
This is clearly the trend in three cities, Boston, New York and Denver, 
for which we have observations over a long enough time period. In 
four other cities, data became available as the decline in property 
crimes was occurring. But there are two cities, Philadelphia and 
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S t .  Louis ,  where no d e c l i n e  i s  observable .  This  may n o t . c o n s t i t u t e  
nega t ive  evidence f o r  t h e  hypothes is .  It may be t h e - r e s u l t  of or- 
g a n i z a t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  unique t o  t h e s e  c i t i e s ,  and d i f f e r e n t  ways of 
r eco rd ing  p rope r ty  cr imes,  e s p e c i a l l y  e a r l y  i n  t h e  s e r i e s  when t h e  
r a t e s  a r e  unusual ly low. 
It would seem from t h e s e  American d a t a  t h a t  t h e  t r end  of 
d e c l i n i n g  p rope r ty  cr imes,  where i t  e x i s t s ,  is  n o t  so  c l e a r l y  ex- 
p l a i n e d  by an a s soc i a t ed  growth i n  t h e  s i z e  of p r o f e s s i o n a l  p o l i c e .  
Proper ty  a r r e s t  r a t e s  come down whether p o l i c e  s i z e  i n c r e a s e s  o r  
n o t ;  and a t  very  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  of p o l i c i n g :  i n  1880 f o r  example, 
Boston wi th  a  popula t ion  of 363,000 h a s  200 pub l i c  p o l i c e  pe r  100,000, 
w h i l e  i n  Chicago t h e  p o l i c e  r a t i o  i s  100 and t h e  t o t a l  popula t ion  i s  
503,000. There i s  however more f l u c t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  proper ty  a r r e s t  
r a t e s  curve i n  Chicago. But p o l i c e  s i z e  may be a  poor i n d i c a t i a n  
of p o l i c e  e f f i c i e n c y .  W i l l  a c l o s e r  examination of p o l i c e  organiza-  
t i o n  exp la in  t h e  unan t i c ipa t ed  d iscrepancy?  
It w i l l  be u s e f u l  t o  sharpen ou r  focus on t h e  t h i n g s  we a r e  
a s se s s ing .  Take t h e  c a s e  of Boston f o r  which we have t h e  longes t  
t ime-ser ies :  a lmost  one hundred y e a r s  i n  a l l .  Proper ty  arrests 
a r e  a t  860 per  100,000 i n  1824, 500 i n  1850. There i s  then  a  s t e e p  
r i s e  dur ing  the  next  decade t o  t h e  peak f o r  t h e  s e r i e s ,  1400 pe r  
100,000 i n  1860. From then  on t h e  t r e n d  is  s t e a d i l y  down, w i th  
mainly smal l  f l u c t u a t i o n s ,  t o  a r a t e  of 550 i n  1920. 
Now cons ider  t h e  e f f i c i e n c y  of po l i c ing .  I n  1822 Boston 
was incorpora ted  a s  a  c i t y  w i th  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  more c o n t r o l  over 
t h e  p o l i c e  came t o  r e s i d e  i n  t h e  ~ a ~ 0 r . l ~  A s t rong  r e fo rmis t  Mayor, 
J o s i a h  Quincy, was e l e c t e d  i n  1823 and l a s t e d  i n  o f f i c e  f o r  s i x  
yea r s .  One of h i s  f i r s t  a c t s  was t o  appoin t  a  c i t y  marshal t o  
coordina te  p o l i c e  work. The person appointed (on a  s i z a b l e  s a l a r y  
f o r  t h e  t imes) ,  Benjamin P o l l a r d ,  was a  vigorous man of h igh  s tand-  
i ng  i n  t h e  community. H e  concent ra ted  p a r t i c u l a r  a t t e n t i o n . o n  
s a n i t a t i o n . a n d  h e a l t h  cond i t i ons  b u t  d i d  n o t  n e g l e c t  c r i m i n a l  work. 
In  1824 t h e  p o l i c e  c o n s i s t e d  of 36 n i g h t  watchmen d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  t h e  
s i x  wards and s i x  cons t ab le s ,  easy enough f o r  one man t o  coo rd ina t e .  
Expenditure on Day P o l i c e  was increased  during t h e  1820's  t o  ensu re  
p a t r o l l i n g  i n  c e r t a i n  a r e a s .  The cons t ab le s  were a c t i v e  p o l i c e  
o f f i c i a l s ,  s t imu la t ed  by f e e s  and rewards a s  w e l l  a s  by P o l l a r d ' s  
watchfu l  eye. A t  t h e  conclus ion  of h i s  term of o f f i c e  i n  1829, 
Mayor Quincy "was f u l l y  s a t i . s f i e d  wi th  h i s  own e f f o r t s  on behal f  
of t h e  po l i ce . "  (Lane 1967: 25) 
The next  two decades i n  Boston, never  noted f o r  t h e  m a s -  
s i v e  popula t ion  i n c r e a s e s  of o t h e r  c i t i e s  such a s  New York and Chicago, 
saw t h e  h ighes t  i n t e r - c e n s a l  i n c r e a s e s  of t h e  century  f o r  t h a t  c i t y ;  
52 pe rcen t  i n  t h e  1830 ' s  and 47 pe rcen t  i n  t h e  1840's .  L a t e r  i n  t h e  
1840's t h e  c i t y  was g r e a t l y  inf luenced  by two newcomers: t h e  rail- 
roads and t h e  pover ty-s t r icken  I r i s h .  These a r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  im-  
p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  t h e s i s  of t h i s  paper.  The f i r s t  meant more acces- 
s i b l e  and e a s i l y  moved proper ty ;  t h e  second an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
propor t ion  of p r o p e r t y l e s s .  
The p o l i c e  grew s t e a d i l y  from 1830 t o  1850 but  were more and 
more d i f f u s e l y  c o n t r o l l e d .  The n i g h t  watch kept  pace wi th  t h e  
popula t ion  and numbered 200 i n  1850. But it  w a s  cons idered  out-  
da ted  by many. There were s i x t e e n  cons t ab le s  and 48 gene ra l  p o l i c e .  
By t h i s  t ime t h e  former were more confined t o  c i v i l  work a t  t h e  
cou r t s .  The l a t t e r  were commanded by a  c i t y  marshal ,  F ranc i s  Tukey, 
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appointed in 1846 and noted for policies of moral enterprise es- 
pecially directed at vice, drinking, selling liquor, gambling and 
prostitution, in which he had the support of the Mayor and city 
council. The police were extremely active in a lot of non-criminal 
work concerning health, sanitation and alleviating the conditions 
of the poor. Property crimes, especially the more notorious rob- 
beries, were given much attention, to the detriment of everyday 
larcenies. The police were not systematically deployed to be avail- 
able for the latter. Rewards, though officially proscribed since 
1846, were still in fact being sought and taken. The police were 
. -1 
also said to be involved in influencing elections. Bribery, ex-/ 
tortion, dishonesty and graft, were widely alleged against the 
police, especially detectives. It may be inferred that at this 
time the police were less efficient about ordinary property of- 
fenses which make up the bulk of property arrest volume, than they 
had been .in the 1820's and were to become later in the 1850ts, and 
so property arrests were at a low point in 1850. It would be our 
guess however, derived from the lowered efficiency of the police, 
their non-systematic deployment, and the assumption that accessible 
and movable property was on the increase, that the rate for property 
offenses would not have declined, but was increasing. 
A centralized police department was begun in 1854, with 
somewhat fewer men than the previous total of part and full-time 
officers. Patrolling day and night was based on neighborhood 
stations--not previously used by the day police--making it easier. 
for citizens to seek help. A harbor police unit was created. New 
police stations were built after 1855, and connected by telegraph 
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in 1858. In 1857 the supervision of this force was strengthened 
as it grew larger, by the introduction of sergeanss. That year 
the'men were outfitted in uniforms. While there was strict en- 
forcement of regulations against officers receiving exrra rewards, 
some compensation was provided in protection agafnsc illness; full 
pay for up to ten slck days, a device which would also encourage 
loyalty to the organization. All the evidence points to an increas- 
ingly more efficient organization with high morale. Stable police 
careers were growing too. The Chief of Police was the same from 
1856 to 1860;infive of the eight police divisions the same cap- 
tains remained in command from 1854 until 1860, 
Arrest rates during the decade show the effects of these 
striking increases in police efficiency and availability. In 1850 
the rate for total arrests was 2,500. (See Figure '7) Ie rose 
to 3,300 in 1853. After the formation of the department, mid-1854, 
the total arrest rate for the year was 9,300. By 1860 the rate had 
gone up to 16,700. The great bulk of the total arrests were on- 
views: a little over half in 1853, three-quarters in 1854 and 80 
percent in 1860, reflecting a growth in proactive- policing, further 
substantiated by the 'information that of the 24,000 arrests in 1860, 
over 20,000 were of foreign-born Americans, mosely Irish. The en- 
tire police force at thac time was native-born, largely from the 
Protestant rural areas of New England. Property arrescs did not 
grow at such a steep rate, but more in keeping with the gradual 
increments in organizational efficiency and morale, Over the re- 
mainder of the series, the greatest fluctuation for all property 
offenses in Boston occurs after 1910, when police morale was at a 
very low ebb. The slump eventuated in the polfce strike of 1919. 
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Let us summarize the argument from the evidence of the 
Boston data. 
1. Property arrests declined from 1824 to 1850. 
2. Policing was efficient for the 1820's but though the 
numbers of.police officials increased during the next two decades, 
their efficiency as an organization declined up to 1850 in two ways: 
a) the police were not systematically deployed among 
the population but concentrated in. the central city where 
more serious property offenses were occurring. They were 
thus less available for citizens to utilize against what 
we assume were the more minor property offenses; 
b) the police consisted of both part-time and full-time 
officials. Command was not strongly centralized in one 
official and policemen, though salaried, were still oper- 
ating in part for rewards from diverse sources. 
3. We assume from the growth of railroads and the increase 
in -the numbers of the propertyless, that property offenses were in- 
creasing. 
4. We attribute the decline in property arrests for the 
period 1824-1850 to the decline in police efficiency. 
5. Police efficiency was greatly increased during the 1850's 
by the creation of the centralized department incorporating all pre- 
vious police officials on a full-time basis. They were systematically 
deployed throughout the population rendering them more available. 
for citizen mobilization. 
6. Arrest rates 'for all offenses increased more than five 
times in the decade, but the increase was most marked for on-views, 
the result of proactive policing. 
7. property arrest rates increased also but less steeply 
than on-views as the organization gradually settled down and as 
citizens faced with minor property depredations came to mobilize 
the police. 
8. After 1860 property arrests declined steadily, with 
minor fluctuations, to 1920. 
9. The size of the police department was increased further 
to 1870, kept up with population growth 1870-1890, and increased 
gradually thereafter. Up to the second decade of the twentieth 
century organizational efficiency and morale were maintained. 
Further during this period, 1860-1920, there was a steady increase 
in the number of private police. 
10. We attribute the decline in property offenses, 1860- 
1920, to the widespread availability of an efficdent police organi- 
zation, and the steady growth in size of both public and private 
police. Thus we would argue that Boston provides clear support 
for the central proposition of the paper. , 
We will not undertake such a close analysis of police or- 
ganization in the other cities, but merely note any important dif- 
ferences from Boston. In San Francisco and Chicago the fluctuations 
of property arrest rates are greater; the same is true for the 
growth of police, reflecting a different pattern of population in- 
crease tban in Boston. Chicago, in particular, grew by leaps and 
bounds; there it was more difficult for police apportionments to 
keep pace. Police size declined relative to population from 1875 
to 1885; so did arrests for property offenses. But the latter 
increased over the next decade as the police department expanded. 
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S t m i l a r l y ,  San F ranc i sco ' s  g r e a t e s t  per iod  of growth w a s  t h e  1860s 
and 1870s. The p o l i c e  department caught up wi th  t h i s  on ly  towards 
t h e  end of t h e  1870s, a f t e r  which po in t  p rope r ty  a r r e s t s  began 
t h e i r  s t e e p e s t  d e c l i n e .  . 
New york and Denver a r e  t h e  c i t i e s  i n  which p rope r ty  a r r e s t s  
dec l ined  wi th  much l e s s i n c r e a s e  i n  p o l i c e  s i z e .  (F igure  4) I n  
Denver, dur ing  t h e  1890 ' s , t h e  numbers i n .  t h e  p o l i c e  - 'department did 
no t  keep up wi th  popula t ion  growth in :  1892-1900, a s  a  s ta te -appoin ted  
Board o f . P o l i c e  Commissioners fought wi th  a C i t y  Council  which had 
t o  p i c k  up t h e  t a b .  The department was a  p o l i t i c a l  f o o t b a l l ,  and s o  
were many men w i t h i n  i t . '  I n  one seven year  period.in t h e  1890s, t h e r e  
were e i g h t  d i f f e r e n t  Chiefs  of Po l i ce .  The d e t e c t i v e s  seemed t o  
o p e r a t e  independent ly ,  more a s  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  p o l i c e .  I f  p o l i c i n g  
had a  r o l e  i n  t h e  d e c l i n i n g  proper ty  a r r e s t s ,  i t  would be  due e i t h e r  
t o  p u b l i c  d e t e c t i v e s  making fewer a r r e s t s  wh i l e  busy wi th  s e r i o u s  
p rope r ty  o f f e n s e s ,  o r  t o  t h e  presence of p r i v a t e  p o l i c e  i n  r e l a t i v e l y  
l a r g e  numbers. There a r e  i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  agencies  were s t r o n g  
and a c t i v e  i n  Denver at: t h e  t ime; no doubt they  were brought p r imar i ly  
f o r  l a b o r  s u v e i l l a n c e  i n  t h e  Colorado mining a r e a s  nearby.  Pinker- 
t o n s  a lone  had 30 r e g u l a r  employees i n  i ts Denver o f f i c e  i n  1893, 
when t h e  p o l i c e  department numbered fewer than  135. The manager had 
been t h e  P inker ton  undercover agent  i n  t h e  Molly Maguire case.  
Another n a t i o n a l  agency had a  well-regarded former Chief of t h e  
Denve r ' po l i ce  a s  i t s  branch manager dur ing  t h e  1890's .  I n  a l l ,  
t h e r e  were f i v e  p r i v a t e  p o l i c e  agencies ' th rough most of t h e  1890's .  
The New York P o l i c e  Department expanded s t e a d i l y  from 1845 
through t h e  1860'9,  decades of cons iderable  popula t ion  i n c r e a s e  
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i n  t h e  c i t y  ( s ee  Richardson 1970).  The evidence sugges t s  an o r g a n i z a ~  
t i on .  of good morale and e f f e c t i v e  command s t r u c t u r e ,  a t  i t s  peak 
around t h e  y e a r s  when r a t e s  f o r  proper ty  a r r e s t s  a l s o  c r e s t e d .  It 
was a . t o u g h  p o l i c e  ins t rument ,  tempered i n  many s t r e e t  b a t t l e s ,  and 
kept  sharp  i n  t h a t  r e s p e c t  by many more through t h e  remainder of 
t h e  cen tu ry ,  a s  s t r i k e s  p r o l i f e r a t e d .  The p o l i c e  s i z e  w a s  h igh  com- 
pared t o  o t h e r  c i t i e s ,  and t h e  department was w e l l  deployed, when i t ,  
l i k e  t h a t  i n  Denver, was squeezed down by p o l i t i c a l  squabbles  a f t e r  
1870. But though t h e  p o l i c e  f o r c e  f a i l e d  t o  keep up w i t h  popula t ion  
i n c r e a s e s ,  i t  d i d  grow a b s o l u t e l y  over t h e  nex t  twenty y e a r s  as t h e  
p rope r ty  a r r e s t s  came tumbling down. Even i n  1890 t h e  pol ice /popula-  
t i o n  r a t i o  was s t i l l  h ighe r  than  i n  any o t h e r  c i t y .  It dropped i n  
t h e  1890's  and p rope r ty  r a t e s  took an upward t u r n .  Both t h e s e  
t r e n d s  were h a l t e d  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1900's .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  New York had 
a very  h igh  r a t i o  of p o l i c e  pe r  square  mi le  of t e r r i t o r y .  (See 
Table 2 )  Many w r i t e r s  have r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  e a r l y  preva lence  of 
p r i v a t e  p o l i c e  i n  n i n e t e e n t h  centdry  New York, b u t  w e  have no 
sys t ema t i c  d a t a .  P inke r tons  opened a New York o f f i c e  i n  1865; by 
1893 t h e  r e g u l a r  employees humbered 125, a sma l l  f r a c t i o n  of NYPD's 
3,700. Regardless  of t h e  numbers of p r i v a t e  p o l i c e  i n  New York, 
t h e  l a r g e  s i z e  of t h e  p o l i c e  department and i t s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and 
deployment, may have been s u f f i c i e n t  t o  respond e f f i c i e n t l y  t o  
p rope r ty  o f f enses .  
Char les ton  and New Orleans a r e  extreme cases  of t h e  p a t t e r n  
found i n  New York and Denver. P o l i c e  s i z e  dec l ined  s t e a d i l y  a s  
p rope r ty  a r r e s t  r a t e s  came down s t e e p l y .  (See F igu re  5 )  The l a r g e  
' ! .  ' .. ., p o l i c e  departments  i n  t h e s e  c i t i e s  were c r e a t e d  be fo re  t h e  C i v i l  
War when control of slaves was the prime concern, especially in 
Charleston where the black proportion of the population and the 
police size were over twice those of New Orleans. In the latter 
city, while 40 percent of the people were black, only half the blacks 
were slaves. 
The extremely high arrest rates in these cities occurred 
during Reconstruction. Policemen were frequently assisted by mili- 
tary units stationed in the area. During these years in Charleston, 
up to 40 percent of those arrested were white, a proportion that 
was quickly turned back when Charleston and southern whites regained 
control of the government in 1877. Whereas the black percentage of 
all.arrests was between 70 percent and 80 percent after 1880, it was . 
50 percent to 70 percent of on-views (whites were more often found 
drunk), and always above 90 percent of property arrests. The black 
arrest rates then reflected a situation where it is likely that 
mainly whites mobilized the-police and most-frequently named blacks 
offenders against property. 
After the new governments were established in Charleston 
and New Orleans, both police departments were reorganized. Stable 
career patterns are apparent from the low staff turnover figures. 
But whereas these continued in New Orleans until 1900, the Charleston 
organization was massively shaken up between 1888 and 1892. Between 
25 percent and 45 percent of the force resigned or were discharged 
in each of those years. The same thing occurred again around 1907, 
though less severely. Property arrests surged upward after each 
of these two disturbances in police organization. Figure 5 shows 
that total and on-view arrests declined on these occasions, further 
evidence of a d e c l i n e  i n  o rgan iza t ion  e f f i c i e n c y .  The New Orleans 
department had h igh  r e s i g n a t i o n  r a t e s  i n  1902 (15 p e r c e n t ) ,  1909 . . 
(23  percent )  and 1913 (17 pe rcen t ) ,  bu t  t h e s e  were mainly from t h e  
l e v e l  of patrolmen; t h e  h ighe r  command remained s t a b l e .  Neverthe- 
l e s s  p rope r ty  a r r e s t  r a t e s  increased  markedly a f t e r  1910. 
Overa l l ,  w e  can say  t h a t  t h e s e  two c i t i e s ,  d e s p i t e  unpromis- 
i ng  f i r s t  appearances,  do n o t  d e t r a c t  f r o m t h e  c e n t r a l  t h e s i s  of 
t h i s  paper:  changing p o l i c e  o rgan iza t ion  a f f e c t s  a r r e s t s  f o r  prop- 
e r t y  cyimes. I n  both  c i t i e s  t h e  p o l i c e  depqrtmepts were s t r o n g  and 
l a r g e  when p rope r ty  a r r e s t  r a t e s  were a t  t h e i r  h i g h e s t .  A t  t h i s  
t i m e  a  major problem of s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  was seen  as t h e  s u r v e i l l a n c e  
of t h e  l a r g e  s l a v e  popu la t ions :  t h e  c i t y  p i t h  t h e  most s l a v e s ,  
Charleston,  had t h e  b i g g e s t  p o l i c e  fo rce .  P o l i c e  numbers were reduced 
because c o n t r o l l i n g  s l a v e s  was no longer  a  problem. The New Orleans 
o rgan izq t ion  thopgh n o t  increased  i n  s i z e  was s t a b l e  i n t e r n a l l y  
through t h e  remainder of t h e  n ine t een th  century  qnd p r o p e r t y  a r r p s t s  
dec l ined ,  The Char l e s ton  department was s t a b l e  up t o  1888 and compar- 
a t i v e l y  l g r g e .  P rope r ty  a r r e s t s  f e l l  dur ing  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  b u t  they  
increas,ed qyer t h e  n e x t  decade a s  t h e  p o l i c e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  underwenf 
s i g n i f j c a n t  changes and i n s t a b i l i t y .  
PhiAadelphia and S t .  Louis pose a d i f f e r e p t  problem f o r  expla-  
na t ion :  t h e  l a c k  of a  d e c l i n e  i n  proper ty  a q r q s t s  through t h e  nine-  
f een th  cqnqury. Both t h e s e  c i t i e s  had a  deployment p ~ o b l e q  g r e a t e r  
than anywhere e lge .  They had many more w i l e s  of t e r r i t o r y  t o  coyer  
and thus  a  lower d e n s i t y  of.policemen. 
- - - - - - - - - -  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
- - - - - - - - - -  
The exp lana t ion  f o r  t h i s  a s s o c i a t i o n  between p o l i c e / t e r r i -  
t o r y  r a t i o  an$ p r o p e r t y  a r r e s t s  i s  probably t h a t  w i t h  fewer p o l i c e  , 
Table 3 . 
Sige of Police Territory, Police per Sqyare Male and Est3rmafed 
Prppdrty Arrest Rates in Five U.S, Cities, $870 and 1880 
, , * :  
. . . . . .  . . . . . . .  . . . , 
. . 
. . . . . Territory I870 , . .  ' ' . . . 1 8 8 0  . .. . . . . .. . 
. . .  
. . 
(sq . .MPles) :
. . . , .  . . . . 
. . . . Pol. per . 'P.A. . Pol, per ? . A .  . . ' . . 
sq. mile ' rate sq. mile rate 
New Y o ~ k  3 9 52.56 1100 66.84 7 10 
St. Lguis $870 18 16.88 359 - - 
1880 63 - - 7.57 400 , 
Source: Annuat Police Reports of the reqpecftve c i ~ i ~ s .  
Comparable information not available for the 
 the^ cities; , v 
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a v a i l a b l e  t o  respond t o  c i t i z e n  c a l l s  f o r  h e l p ,  fewer p e t t y  p r o p e r t y  
o f f enses  wouSd'hav& r e s u l t e d  i n  a r r e s t s .  Minor o f f enses  made up 
t h e  volume i n  p rope r ty  a r r e s t s  i n  a l l  c i t i e s  dur ing  t h e  second h a l f  
of t h e  n ine t een th  cen tu ry .  Responding t o  c i t i z e n  c a l l s  f o r  h e l p  
about t h e s e  was no t  ea sy  when p o l i c e  p a t r o l l e d  on f o o t  and te lephones  
. . 
were unavai lab le  u n t i l  t h e  1890's.  I f  t h i s  l i n e  of t h ink ing  i s  
c o r r e c t ,  i t  may be hypothesized t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be  p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  . >  
more s e r i o u s  o f f enses  among t h e  p rope r ty  a r r e s t s  f o r  S t .  Louis and 
Ph i l ade lph ia .  But i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  test t h i s  p ropos i t i on  a t  
t h e  p r e s e n t . s t a g e  of ana lyz ing  our  da t a .  
There a r e  two' a d d i t i o n a l  ' organ iza t ion  f e a t u r e s  p e c u l i a r .  . t o  
~ h i l a d e l ~ h i a  among t h e  c i t i e s  examined: t h e  cont inua t ion '  of de tec-  
- 
t i v e s  a s  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  p o l i c e ,  p e r i o d i c a l l y  independent of t h e  
Chief of Po l i ce ,  a f t e r  t h e  department was e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1854; and 
. - . . I  
t h e  p r a c t i c e  of p o l i c e  m a g i s t r a t e s ,  who were i n  f a c t  Aldermen e l e c t e d  
t o  t h e  j u s t i c e  r o l e  by Counci l ,  a t t e n d i n g  s t a t i o n  houses d a i l y  t o  
d ispose  of a r r e s t s  un t i1 .1868 .  
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The combination sugges t s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  
was descr ibed  f o r  Boston around 1850: p rope r ty  a r r e s t s  were low 
because many were n o t  recorded ,  En t r ep reneur i a l  d e t e c t i v e s  sought 
r a t h e r  t o  recover  proper ty  than  a r r e s t  t h e  of fender .  When t h e  
s e p a r a t e  d e t e c t i v e  department was abol i shed  temporar i ly  i n  1868, i t  
was a l l e g e d  a s  reason  f o r t h e  move t h a t  t h e  d e t e c t i v e s  had been d i s -  
charging p r i s o n e r s  from custody wi thout  t h e  fo rma l i ty  of going be- 
f o r e  a  mag i s t r a t e ,  i . e .  r e g i s t e r i n g  an a r r e s t .  Problems w i t h  con- 
t r o l l i n g  t h e  d e t e c t i v e s  cont inued t o  be r epo r t ed  through t h e  1880's .  
The u n i t  was f o r e v e r  be ing  d i s so lved ,  o r  "brought under f i r m  c o n t r o l . "  
Sprogle, writing his history of the Philadelphia Police Department 
in 1887, describes the organizational condition. "Perhaps in no 
other (unit) is professional jealousy so rife as among the detec- 
tives. While this feeling may add incentive. . . .it undoubtedly 
interferes with the effectiveness of the department, inasmuch as it 
engenders personal animosities among the men, a state of affairs 
which is not only destructive of discipline, but. . .provocative 
of a clashing of aims and interests." (Sprogle, p. 252) Entrepren 
neurial detectives would also have paid more attention to serious 
property offenses than to the minor ones. 
Thus in St. Louis and Philadelphia also, police organization 
is shown to be closely related to the pattern of arrests for prop- 
erty offenses. In these cases the state of the organizations re- 
sulted in even fewer of the property offenses that were likely to 
have occurred leading to recorded arrests. 
Many qualifications have now been added to the data about 
property arrests and police size as these fluctuated through the 
latter half of the nineteenth century in nine American cities. The 
qualifications mainly concern police organization. In general they 
tend to support the notion, dubious at first glance, that crimes 
where citizens mobilized the police were likely to be reduced to 
the extent that police organization was sufficiently large, available 
and efficient. 
The Development of English Criminal Statistics 
What we know of crime in England in the nineteenth century 
comes mainly from two sources. The first is anecdotal evidence, 
some in the form of tracts or reminiscences of such persons as 
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P a t r i c k  ~ o l ~ u h o u n ,  t h e  London m a g i s t r a t e  and p o l i c e  reformer,  o r  
Percy F i t z g e r a l d ,  a  Bow-Street runner who publ i shed  memoirs (Col- 
quhoun 1800; F i t z g e r a l d  1888).  Much anecdo ta l  evidence of crime, 
and e s p e c i a l l y  of p o l i c i n g  is  t o  be found i n  t h e  Home O f f i c e  Papers ,  
t h e  r e p o r t s  and minutes of evidence taken be fo re  S e l e c t  Committees 
of Par l iament ,  and i n  borough r eco rds .  These sources  h e l p  charac- 
t e r i z e  c r imina l s  and c r imina l  a c t i v i t y ,  p o l i c e  and changes i n  p o l i c -  
ing ,  and c i t i z e n  i n t e r a c t i o n .  A second, q u a n t i t a t i v e  source  of i n -  
formation about crime i n  n ine t een th  century  England c o n s i s t s  of t h e  
c r imina l  a b s t r a c t s  prepared by t h e  Home Off ice .  Although a v a i l a b l e  
s i n c e  1805, t h i s  r i c h  source of in format ion  has  been s c a r c e l y  
tapped by modern c r imino log i s t s ;  i t  has  been avoided by some p r i m a r i l y  
because of t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  s i z e  and d u t i e s  of p o l i c e  f o r c e s  
i n  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  of England and a t  d i f f e r e n t  t imes i n  t h e  nine- 
t e e n t h  century  (Tobias 1969).  l5 The cha l lenge  t o  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  
record is  based on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  r ap id  development of t h e  po l i c -  
i n g  system had an obvidus impact on t h e  s t a t i s t i c s .  We ag ree  and 
I 
we.intend t o  i nco rpora t e  t h i s  warning i n t o  our  arguments about t h e  
" v i s i b i l i t y 1 '  of crime. There is no modern s t a t i s t i c a l  record of 
p o l i c e - c i t i z e n  c o n t a c t s  which i s  no t  s u b j e c t  t o  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  same 
b i a ses .  (Black 1969) And wi th  c a r e f u l  handl ing ,  t h e  s t a t i s t i c s  
a v a i l a b l e  even f o r  r e l a t i v e l y  e a r l y  pe r iods  can be made t o  y i e l d  
informat ion  both about  p o l i c i n g  and about a c t u a l  crime r a t e s .  
The c a r e f u l  d i scuss ion  of t h e  development of England's 
c r imina l  s t a t i s t i c s  i n  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  century  by V.  A. C.  G a t r e l l  
and T. Hadden provides  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  expos i t i on  o f f e r e d  he re .  
Clerks  of t h e  Courts  of t h e  Ass ize  and of t h e  Quar te r  Sess ions  of 
each county were first instructed to send information regarding criminal 
indictments ("indictable committals to trial") to the Home Secretary in 
1805. Between 1805 and 1892, when the criminal statistics achieved 
their modem form and comprehensiveness, three types of changes occurred 
which hamper over-time comparison of crime rates. First, different 
classification schemes for crimes were used before and after 1834. 
Secondly, the statistics on indictable committals for the first two 
thirds of the century, to 1857, do not cover all crimes charged, 
much less all crimes known to the police. The major omission from 
crimes charged consists of crimes tried at the petty sessions, courts 
. . 
held by one or two Justices of the Peace between sittings of the 
. . 
Quarter .Sessions. Thirdly, the jurisdiction of the petty sessions . 
was expanded periodically to include more crimes which were formerly 
triable only at the Quarter Sessions. Hence, the statistics showing 
the number of crimes indictable at the Assizes or Quarter Sessions 
(the only series to run from 1805 on) require an adjustment in . . 
. . 
. .  . 
nearly every decade to compensate for crimes lost to the petty . . 
. ,  . 
sessions. 
Considered in the light of these changes, the criminal . . 
statistics fall into three distinct periods or segments for purposes 
. . . .. . . 
of observing trends over time. In the period from 1805 to 1834 there 
is no means of compensating for the loss of cases to the petty ses- 
sions. For example, some types of assault cases were transferred to 
the petty sessions in 1827 and 1828, presumably accounting for the slight 
. '  dip in the criminal indictments for those years (see Appendix Table A-3). . 
Further in 1834, the fifty-six crime categories used in the statistical 
reports between 1805 and 1834 were reduced to six. Some violent prop- 
erty crimes such as arson or robbery were mixed with non-property 
crimes. A category "non-vfolent crimes against property" was created 
which included all other offenses against property. No further break- 
down of the statistics in che published reports is available after 
1834. For the period between 1834 and 1857 we can partially compensate 
for further changes in the jurisdiction of the petty sessions by using 
a composite of two statistical series to represent crime trends. 
Beginning in 1834, the number of persons imprisoned by the petty 
sessions each year is available. Adding this to the Quarter Sessions 
and Assize indictments we obtain a measure of crime which is subject 
to fewer aberrations due to administrative changes. In the period 
between 1857 and 1892, the total number of petty session trials is 
available for each year, and thus we can fully compensate for the 
changes in jurisdiction which occured by adding petty session trials 
and indictable crimes together to form a single index of crime trends. 
The following discussion of non-violent crimes against property 
will be limited as much as possible to comparisons of crime rates 
within each of these three periods. In the appendix to this chapter 
we have included tables based on Gatrell and Hadden's data showing 
property crime rates adjusted for each period as described above. 
For purposes of comparison, data for the county of Lancashire are 
included. Compared with the rest of England, Lancashire industrialized 
early, urbanized early, and organized its police force early. Its 
crime statistics make an interesting contrast with England as a whole. 
Trends in Crime, 1805-1892 
Armed with Gatrell and Hadden's data and with plenty of caveats, 
what can we say about non-violent crimes against property in the 19th 
century? For the early years of the 19th century, there is a steady 
upward trend in the number of indictable committals per 100,000 in 
the population. Over the first twenty years of the period, Lancashire 
runs well ahead of the country as a whole, but the pattern is the same. 
While the trend is clearly upward, it is far from monotonic. For 
England as a whole, up to the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the low 
point is 1808, a year of universal trade depression in England and 
especially in Lancashire. The high is 1805, a boom year. Following 
1812, however, the trend is steadily upward. The period between 1813 
and 1820 marks the steepest rise in the overall crime rate during the 
entire 19th century. Thereafter, the indictable crime rate slackens 
through the boom years 1822-24 and begins to cliinb again following the 
crisis of 1826. The year of the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832 
marks the highest point in the first period. 
In the second period, the movement of property crimes per 
, 100,000 in the population is much more erratic. Contrary to one theory 
that crime rates were mushrooming (Morrison 1892; Radzinowicz 1966), the - ' . 
years 1836, 1846, and 1853 yield nearly identical rates spanning two 
decades. Between these years, maxima are reached most.noticeably in the 
years of heaviest repression of Chartism, 1842, and 1848. The year 1839, 
another year of widespread Chartist activity, yielded a relatively low 
rate, apparently due-to the Home Office policy of restricting use of the 
military to assist local magistrates in suppressing disturbances. 
In the'third period, the overall crime rate can only be described 
as dramatically declining, with some irregularity. The drop is most 
dramatic for property crimes but true for other crimes as well, partic- 
ularly after 1870. While the statistical series for this period cannot 
be directly compared with those for the preceding two periods, wherever 
we choose to place the maximum property crime rate for the century, it 
must be before 1857, for the trend was certainly downward thereafter. 
In fact, except for the two years 1855 and 1856 for which data are 
missing, we can say with some assurance that recorded property crime 
declined steadily from before mid-century. 
Let us emphasize once again that we are describing trends in 
recorded property crimes. We are not yet ready to maintain that this 
represents an actual trend, although any explanation which makes a 
decline in reported property crime of such length artifactual must 
surely be tortuous indeed. 
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To explain these trends in property crime in the nineteenth 
century, we offered a set of factors at the outset which included both 
conditions leading to changes in behavior defined as criminal and con- 
ditions under which persons are likely to be apprehended and accused of 
crime. The set of factors which we suggest is complex and includes the 
behavior of the police as well as the behavior of criminals. By contrast, 
previous attempts to explain 19th century crime trends in England have 
focused almost exclusively on changes in the rate of behavior defined as 
criminal and have given extraordinary weight to simple economic sources 
of motivation to commit crimes. The article by Gatrell and Hadden on 
which we have relied for the data of crime rates contains an appealing 
version of this argument--so appealing that it is worthwhile examining 
briefly their argument that the business cycle explains short term prop- 
erty crime fluctuations. Relying on a visual comparison of graphs of 
fluctuations in the business cyele17 and of fluctuations in the rate of 
property crime, they conclude: "the rule that nineteenth century prop- 
erty crime increased in depression and diminished with prosperity holds 
true, allowing for the occasional disjunction in the graphical correla- 
tions, and for a slight diminution in the clarity of the association 
in later years of the century compared with the earlier" {Gatrell and 
Hadden 1972: 369). 
Despite suggestive visual similarities in the graphs, particularly 
during the trade depressions of the 1840s and 1880s, there is little cor- 
relation between the movement of crime rates and the business cycle in a 
statistical sense before 1834 or after 1856. For the first third of the 
century, between 1820 and 1834, the product-moment correlation between 
the two indexes is -.09. Between 1835 and 1850 the negative correlation 
rises to -.59. l8 In 1923, Dorothy S. Thomas published the results of 
extensive efforts to discover correlations between social indicators, 
including non-violent property crimes, and the British business cycle 
(Thomas, 1923). Her results for.the second half of the 19th century 
show, convincingly, no correlation, suggesting however the possible 
emergence of a pattern of lagged positive correlations between the 
business cycle and property crime rates. 19 
After 1850, property crime statistics for England seem to be 
dom'inated by tlie overall downward-trend to tlie end'of tlie century.. 
Moreover, even short term fluctuations follow strikingly different 
'patterns after 1880. The boom year 1883 almost coincides with a peak 
year of property crime, 1882, and the depression of 1886 coincides with 
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a'low property crime rate. However one interprets the shortrun pattern, 
the extreme variability of the statistical correlation with the business' 
cycle (none, then negative, t.hen positive) only underscores the argument 
that 19th century properey crime rates were not the product of any single 
underlying economic motivation. They consist of a composite of trends 
in conditions producing a varied set of motivations to crime, opportuni- 
ties for crime, and effective sanctions for crime. 
Changes in British Policing, 1800-1900 * 
A partial explanation of change in 19th century crime rates is 
the development of more effective police. If we define police as full- 
time governmental employees charged with the responsibility for enforcing 
the law, then England had few fn 1800. England, like most European 
countries was policed largely by part-time, unpaid constables, employed 
or appointed by local government, Private companies or individuals 
employed police as well, since the police provided by local government 
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were seldom adequate. 1t is extremely difficult to list the total 
number of these police. Policing was in large part the responsibility 
of private citizens who were liable to be appointed or elected (by the 
court leet or.overseers of the poor) to serve as constables for one year 
in some places; it was on them that the onus of arrests and criminal 
prosecutions rested if the sanctions of the criminal law were to be 
brought to bear. 
Full-time, paid policing was a luxury enjoyed mainly by London 
which, through the efforts of Henry Fielding, acquired a paid magistrate 
at the Bow-Street police office and a staff of full-time constables under 
his jurisdiction in 1750 (Critchely 1967: 32). The Bow-Street magistrates 
(and eventually the other London magistrates) were answerable directly to 
the Home Office. The rest of England successfully resisted such central- 
ization and nationalization of its police. But while London enjoyed the 
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advantages of paid magistrates and the Bow-Street officers, this advantage 
was not widely distributed. The metropolitan area about London was 
actually a bewildering variety of separate local governmental units, each 
with.its separate responsibility for policing within its boundaries. 
Policing authorities from.one jurisdiction were not empowered, much less 
inclined, to enter other jurisdictions in pursuit of criminals or to 
assist other constables or police. 
Outside London, boroughs frequently had some form of pol>ce. 
The emphasis was on providing a night watch, however, and not on patrol- 
ling by day. Most boroughs had laughably inadequate police forces. 
Bristol had twelve policemen for a population of 59,000 in 1831. 
Kidderminster (population 14,000 in 1831) had two constables appointed 
for one year terms. Leeds had five total day police for a population of 
over 123,000 (Somers-Vine 1879: 185-191). 
Outside the boroughs, policing was carried out, if at all, 
largely by the parish constable. Parish constables usually served with- 
out pay; in practice they were non-professional and appointed by the 
Justices of the Peace for the county for a term, usually, of one year. 
In many Parishes (or townships in the north), constables failed to be 
appointed. The number of constables was always small. For example, 
in 1800 Manchester, with a population above 70,000 had one deputy 
constable with four assistants; by 1830, with Manchesterls-population 
at more than 187,000, the number of assistants had increased 'to 11. 
Prior to the establishment of paid, full-time police, policing 
relied on citizen self-help and the profit motive provided by the 
practice of granting rewards f0.r informing against criminals. Citizens 
were free to form societies to share the burden of costs of prosecutions 
and the expense of hiring private police. After one of the first 
inquiries into ,the state of private policing in England, the Constabulary 
Commissi~n of 1836 reported that over 500 private societies for the prose- 
cution of felons existed fn England, many of which employed private police. 
It was common, moreover, for commercial enterprise (particularly those 
which were large-scale.and involved in transporting goods over the none- 
too-safe waterways and highways) to provide for policing privately. 
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For the parish constable, as well as for most citizens who were . 
not victims, ther'major incentive to, apprehend'~riminals.~was profit.. 
The use of informers to enforce the criminal law has a long history in 
England. Informing was encouraged especially for such crimes as petty 
theft and violation of statutes regulating trade (Beresford, '1958). 
Typically the lion's share of the fine levied by the convicting magis- 
trate went to the informer. Constables were expected to make their 
living while in office by collecting rewards for informing, as well as 
assessing fees for other services. There appear to have been few 
standards for the day to day apprehension of criminals or for per- 
formance of policing duties. In cities such as Manchester, a steady 
flow of thieves and other criminals was, nevertheless, brought before 
the magistrates, by victims and by constables, so the system was not 
without some effect. Targets of policing, however, were selected 
according to whether the victim could safely bring the culprit before a 
magistrate himself, or whether potential profit was sufficiently high 
to interest a constable. 
.In the period before the establishment of full-time police by 
Parliamentary reenactment, there was one other type of "policing" which 
played an important role from time to time. In the minds of advocates 
of a full-time police for England in the first half of the 19th century, 
the control of crowds and of political unrest was as great-an incentive 
as individual crime (Hart 1951: 26). The military was used regularly 
for' this type of policing in .London until the establishment of the 
Metropolitan Police Force in 1829, and outside of London for most of 
the century. The arrival of a troop of cavalry, plus the swearing in 
of responsible local citfzens during periods of popular disturbances, 
enormously increased the arresting capacity of local police, and could 
not have been without effect on arrest and indictment rates in key 
periods of social unrest. 
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The full-time police of England developed in four stages. 
1) In 1829, Parliament established a police force for the London metro- 
politan area, paid for. by Parliament. By 1830, London had about 3350 
full-time police to replace the hodgepodge of parish constables, private 
police, borough police and -others which had operated independently up to 
that time in separate.governmenta1 units within the metropolitan,area 
(Hart, 1951: 34). ' 2) In 1835, the Municipal Corporations Act restruc- 
tured the 178 'parliamentary Boroughs of England, investing them with . 
the power, among other things, to establish a full-time police to be 
paid and appointed by a watch committee of citizens of,the borough 
(though constables still remained subject to most of the commands of 
Justices of the Peace of the county). 3) Between 1839 and 1842, two 
acts were passed permitting establishment of county police forces by 
Justices of the Peace and providing for regular pay for parish constables. 
The county police forces, if established, were to be paid for by special 
county taxes. The resistence of the Justices of the Peace and the county 
gentry to a police county force is reflected in the provisions which 
specify that a maximum of one policeman per 1000 inhabitants could be 
hired under the acts (Cricchley 1967: 85). 4) Not until 1856, however, 
were county and borough police made mandatory. The National government 
was to pay 25% and have authority to inspect the forces and to withhold 
funds from forces which did not meet its regulations. Smaller boroughs 
were exempted from this requirement, but over the next fifty years a 
series of acts gradually forced smaller and middle-sized boroughs to 
merge their forces with those of the county (Hart, 1951: 35-40). 
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The power of the Home Office to regulate the police was based solely on 
the power to withhold funds. 
It took many decades for the number and organization of these 
police forces to fill out. In London, the number of police, from 1830 
onwards, kept approximately abreast of the population. London had one 
full-time policeman for every 445 inhabitants in 1830. In 1840 London 
had one policeman for every 443 inhabitants; in 1861, one for every 441 
inhabitants. The lowest inhabitants-to-police ratio in the history of' 
the force is 355, recorded in 1891 (Hart, 1951: 34). The rest of England 
acquired full-time police at a slower rate. When the County and Borough 
Police Act was passed in 1857, there were still fewer than 20,000 full- 
time police, including the London police. There was one policeman for 
every 1040 inhabitants in England and Wales and one policeman for every 
1365 inhabitants outside of London. By 1901, with over 44,000 police 
in England and Wales, there was one policeman for every 738 persons. 
In 1921 the figure dipped to 637, but rose again reaching 727 in 1949 
(Hart, 1951: 34). 
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Before the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, fewer than seven 
boroughs had established full-time paid police. Within two years of the 
act, another 83 reported establishing paid police forces. After this 
spurt, other boroughs reported establishing forces at the rate of three 
or four a year. But by 1853, seventeen of the 178 boroughs had still 
failed to report and six were known not to have police forces. J.M. Hart 
estimates the total police shared by all boroughs, excluding London, in 
1846 to be 3850 - + 250, or about one for every 1000 inhabitants. In 1853 
she estimates 4375 - + 50 police, or one for every 940 inhabitants (Hart, 
1955: 418). By 1901, the ratio for boroughs had fallen to one policeman 
for every 710 inhabitants (Martin and Wilson, 1969: 47). 
The distribution of the police across boroughs at mid-century was 
far from even. The threeslargest (excluding London, Manchester, Birming- 
ham and Liverpool) had the lowest inhabitants-per-policeman ratios. 
Together Liverpool and Manchester employed 20% of all the police in 
boroughs outside of London. Liverpool's force dated back to the early 
19th century, necessitated in part by the need to keep order in the 
vicinity of the docks. Manchester and Birmingham applied for special 
Parliamentary acts supporting their borough police in 1839, well in advance 
of the act of 1856 which made a similar arrangement mandatory for all 
boroughs and counties. In the establishment of police, the newer boroughs 
led the older ones. Between 1835 and 1853, nineteen new boroughs were 
established under the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. (Seven of these 
were in the populous county of Lancashire.) Each of the nineteen estab- 
lished a police force within two years of its incorporation. 
The establishment of county police forces lagged still further 
behind. Following the permissive legislation in 1839, only thirteen 
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counties used the powers granted by it to establish a county police force 
within two years of its passing. Over the next seven years another seven 
counties and parts of five more took advantage of the act. The forces 
established under the act were usually small. In 1848, 2500 police had 
been employed by county forces established under the 1839 act for areas 
with a total of 4.5 million inhabitants, or 1 policeman for every 1800 
inhabitants (Radzinowicz, 1968: 269). County taxpayers resisted the 
establishment of police forces. The rural areas where most of them lived 
did not face a chronic crime problem of the same proportions as the more 
densely populated parts of England. County gentry were concerned with 
civil disorder, and county police forces were established primarily in 
counties which had experienced the Swing or Chartist riots in the 
preceding ten years. 
In 1857, England made the establishment of a police force manda- 
tory for counties and mosc boroughs. Between 1860 and 1900, the most 
rapid increase in numbers of police occurred in the non-borough areas of 
England, which had lagged behind in the era of permissive legislation. 
While the distribution of police became more even, there were still extreme 
disparities. In the mid-18701s, six boroughs still had police forces 
consisting of a single policeman. Professionalization progressed unevenly. 
By 1908, 93% of all borough forces were commanded by officers who were 
career policemen. By contrast only 12% of the chief constables of county 
forces were career policemen (Critchley, 1967: 143). Counties preferred 
gentlemanly qualifications and family position to professional training. 
Local control of police remained an issue, even though boroughs and 
counties were required to establish a police force. The Municipal 
Corporations Act, which attempted to modify the means of exercising local 
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control and which extended the requirements of the act of 1857 to 
smaller boroughs, was hotly debated for several years before its passage 
in 1888. The tenaciousness of local interests further contributed to 
the unevenness of the development of the police and its very gradual 
professionalization, even after mid-century. 
The transition from parish constables to full-time, paid police 
in England in the course of che nineteenth century had four important 
characteristics. First, the increase in full-time police occurred with 
varying speed for different regions of the country. In London, the 
increase was extremely rapid. The number of police increased much more 
slowly outside the metropolis, gaining momentum particularly after the 
passage of the County and Bomugh Police Act of 1856. The number of 
police increased most rapidly in areas of greatest population density. 
County gentry were concerned with the availability of police only during 
periods of widespread rioting, when the tranquillity of country estates 
was disrupted. Otherwise police were considered by the gentry to be a 
financial liability and an encroachment on the prerogatives of the 
Justices of the Peace if nationa1.government retained any control what- 
soever. Boroughs and market towns, on the other hand, while equally 
sensitive to encroachment on local governmental prerogative, were more 
concerned with individual crime, Their markets and flourishing shops 
were the site of exposed and readily movable property and became tar- 
gets for thieves. As shops multiplied and periodic markets grew. 
fewer, the opportunities for petty theft multiplied (Tobias 1969: 195). 
Crowded streets invited pickpockets, and dense housing made personal 
belongings more accessible to burglars. Reform was achieved first in 
those administrative units which could readily take charge of - 
reorganization and administration of police, namely the boroughs, rather 
than in unincorporated towns. 23 The Reform Act of 1832 and its conse- 
quent, the Municipal Corpora~ion Act of 1835, opened the political door 
to the modernization of the police in the country's largest towns. 
Secondly, rapid increase in the number of police outside 
London was directly related to the national government's willingness 
to pay for them, as well as its readiness to require the establishment 
of forces. In 1856, the national government agreed to pay 25% of the 
costs of maintaining a police force as required under the County and 
Borough Police Act. At the same time, England never experienced a 
break with the political traditions of the preceding two centuries, 
which had resulted in entrenchment of local governmental prerogatives. 
While from the 1840s, England massively increased central governmental 
regulation of industry and welfare, absent since the Tudor era, it 
remained largely laissez faire as far as prescribing who should run 
local government and how. The management of the police is an excel- 
lent example. Until 1856, the Home Office and Parliament were able 
to bring no stronger pressure to establish local police forces than 
the withholding of troops and Metropolitan Police when they were 
requested by local governments to assist in the handling of local dis- 
turbances. The statutes affecting the establishment of police prior 
to 1856 reflect the pattern of legislation establishment for other 
areas of Parliamentary concern during this period: of permitting 
modification of local government only on certain terms, but not of 
prescribing reform. 
The effect of local governmental resistance to the imposition 
of controls was to force Parliament to work through local government 
to establish police forces in England, and to prevent setting up inde- 
pendent police authorities under national direction. While the Home 
Secretary was given a free hand by Parliament under the Act of 1856 to 
withhold funds for failme to comply with his regulations (thus giving 
him substantial power over local police forces), the immediate authority 
for directing the police remained in local hands, shared by Justices of 
the Peace and elected represencatives of the local citizenry. By 
contrast with the indirect concrol exercised by national government over 
local police in England, French police were locally financed and nation- 
ally directed (Hart 1951: 37). 
Thirdly, the character of the change from parish constables to 
what contemporaries identified as "preventive" police was as significant 
as the increase in numbers, While the contemporary debate surrounding 
the coming of the borough and county police in England need not occupy 
us here, it is worth noting that contemporaries were keenly aware that 
the professionalization of police meant primarily the increased capacity 
of police to observe and control behavior in public places. The rapidity 
of.the increase in numbers actually underrepresents the capacity of the . 
police for surGeillance in comparison with 'subsequent periods. Not only 
did cities such as London and Liverpool have more police .per 1000 inhab- 
itants by the 1890s than at any time before or since, but because of 
long working days the number of manhours worked by police per 1000 in 
the population as a whole actually reached a maximum in 1891 which has 
not been surpassed since that time. 2 4 
Professionalization of the police meant a profound change from 
the older fee-for-service system where the constable picked targets with 
an eye to increasing his income.25 The parish constable was not uniformed 
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and had no particular wish to be visible to the public at large. The 
persons who supervised the parish constable's conduct, the county magis- 
trates, did not pay his salary, nor did they very often live in the 
towns which he policed. The immediate effect of the 1835, 1839, and 
1856 acts was the introduction of uniformed patrolmen into the street 
life of cities. At the same time the acts encouraged a new chain of 
command, completed by statute in 1882, which displaced Justices of the 
Peace and placed immediate control of police in the hands of a chief 
constable (often a professional of the Metropolitan Police Force) in 
the counties, and a committee of borough residents in the towns (Hart, 
1951: 104). The casual administration of the Justices of the Police 
was replaced by more active and interested control. A suggestive 
benchmark for the difficulty of the transition from a non-policed to a 
policed society is the average number of assaults on policemen annually 
in each decade since 1856. In the 1870s, each year about 13,000 . 
asaults on police were recorded. In the 1890s, about 11,000 were 
recorded annually. Since 1920 the number has remained at about 6000 
per year (Martin and Wilson, 1969: 23). 
Fourthly, while shifts in England's political structure following 
the Reform Act of 1832, the Chartist movement, and the trend toward 
centralization of government after 1850 all stimulated development of 
the police, none seems to have substantially affected the functions 
performed by the police. The extent to which older, private and non- 
professional means of policing were retained and blended with the new 
full-time police is characteristic of England. Some characteristics of 
older private and parish police forces were retained outright: citizens 
were still sworn as special constables when the need arose, citizens still 
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bore  t h e  l e g a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a s s i s t i n g  i n  t h e  apprehension of 
f e l o n s ,  and t h e  de te rmina t ion  of p o l i c i n g  p r i o r i t i e s  and p o l i c i e s  remained 
f i r m l y  i n  t h e  hands of l o c a l  government, The l a t t e r  f e a t u r e  s u r e l y  con- 
t r i b u t e d ,  f o r  example, t o  t h e  surge  of a r r e s t s  f o r  drunkenness i n  t h e  
l a t t e r  p a r t  of t h e  19t.h century  (Hoyle 1874).  A f u r t h e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
of p r i v a t e  po1icing;unl ike t h e  m i l i t a r y ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  . B r i t i s h  p o l i c e  do 
not  s h a r e  i n  t h e  s t a t e ' s  monopoly on t h e  use  of f o r c e  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  of 
c a r r y i n g  arms. B r i t i s h  p o l i c e ,  l i k e  t h e  o rd ina ry  c i t i z e n ,  remain unarmed 
and c a r e f u l l y  d i s t i ngu i shed  from m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  i n  s t y l e  of d r e s s  and 
r equ i r ed  demeanor. And i n  cou r t  t h e  p o l i c e  have r e t a i n e d  t h e  l e g a l  
s t a t u s  of t h e  common informer.  
The t r e n d  i n  changes i n  j u d i c i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  t h e  nine- 
t e e n t h  cen tu ry  con t r ibu ted  t o  t h e  blending of p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  respon- 
s i b i l i t y  f o r  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  problem of p o l i c i n g .  S ince  c i t i z e n s  
p rosecu te  c r imina l  ca ses  themselves a t  p e t t y  s e s s i o n s ,  t h e  ex tens ion  of 
summary j u r i s d i c t i o n  made prosecut ion  of c r i m i n a l s  e a s i e r  f o r  t h e  ord inary  
c i t i z e n  t o  conduct without  p u b l i c  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  The ex tens ion  of p e t t y  
s e s s i o n s  must have encouraged a d d i t i o n a l  p rosecu t ion  by persons f o r  whom 
Quar te r  Ses s ions  o r  Assize prosecut ions  would have been t o o  expensive o r  
t oo  much t r o u b l e .  I n  any even t ,  t h e  d a t a  show a  cont inuous r i s e  i n  t h e  
number of c a s e s  brought a t  p e t t y  s e s s ions .  
The Impact of Full-Time P o l i c i n g  
A l l  f ou r  of t h e  major changes i n  p o l i c i n g  i n  t h e  19th  century  
tended t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of d e t e c t i o n  of crime o r  t h e  proba- 
b i l i t y  of s a n c t i o n s  f o r  crime. Our hypothes is  i s  t h a t  t h e s e  changes 
produced two t r e n d s  i n  proper ty  crime r a t e s :  a s h o r t  term inc rease  i n  
t h e  amount of recorded crime by inc reas ing  r e p o r t s  of crimes and a r r e s t s ,  
and a  long term t r end  toward lower proper ty  crime r a t e s .  The d a t a  f o r  
England sugges t  some mod i f i ca t ion  of t h e s e  hypotheses,  bu t  i n  t h e  main 
t h e  p i c t u r e  is  much a s  p r e d i c t e d .  F i r s t ,  t h e  per iod  of most r a p i d  
inc rease  i n  t h e  crime rate does not  correspond t o  t h e  per iod  of most 
r ap id  a d d i t i o n  of f u l l - t i m e  p o l i c e  f o r  England as a  whole. The sha rp  
r i s e  i n  committals f o r  i n d i c t a b l e  o f f enses  between 1815 and 1820 can 
only be expla ined  by changes i n  t h e  ope ra t ion  of e x i s t i n g  p o l i c i n g ,  by 
changes i n  t h e  methods of r e p o r t i n g  crimes o r  changes i n  t h e  a c t u a l  
r a t e  of behavior  which was de t ec t ed  a s  crime. It i s  u n l i k e l y ,  however, 
t h a t  t h e r e  was a  major i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  number of p o l i c e . d u r i n g  t h i s  
per iod  ( o r  a t  l e a s t  evidence of such an i n c r e a s e  has  n o t  appeared) .  
Secondly, when t h e  number of p o l i c e  began t o  r i s e  r a p i d l y ,  a f t e r  1830, 
and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  a f t e r  1856, crime r a t e s  f o r  England d i s p l a y  e i t h e r  
e r r a t i c  i n c r e a s e s  and dec reases  o r  a d e c i s i v e l y  downward t r end .  
The r a t e s  which we a r e  observing a r e  a c t u a l l y  complex and 
composite. Complex, f i r s t  of a l l  because o t h e r  f a c t o r s  than  p o l i c i n g  
undoubtedly had t h e i r  e f f e c t  on crime r a t e s .  But t h e  r a t e s  a r e  a l s o  
composite because t h e  cr ime r a t e s  r ep re sen t  t h e  t o t a l  of crime r a t e s  i n  
226 s e p a r a t e  p o l i c e  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  ( i n  1857) and a n  unknown number of 
non-policed a r e a s .  We can expect  crime r a t e s  t o  fo l low t h e  p a t t e r n  
p red ic t ed  by our  arguments f o r  reasonably well-defined p o l i c e  j u r i s -  
d i c t i o n s .  The composite of r i s i n g  and d e c l i n i n g  t r e n d s  i n  p rope r ty  
crime r epor t ed  t o  t h e  Home Of f i ce  f o r  s e p a r a t e  p o l i c e  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  
( t h e  r e s u l t  of t h e  e r r a t i c  i n t roduc t ion  of p o l i c e  i n  England),  could 
produce t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  n a t i o n a l  t r e n d  between 1834 and 1856. Only 
a t  r a r e  i n t e r v a l s  would p a r t i c u l a r  r e g i o n a l  o r  borough r a t e s  dominate 
t h e  aggrega te  n a t i o n a l  r a t e s .  There i s  some evidence of t h i s  dur ing  t h e  
Chartist disturbances and subsequent.repression of 1842 and 1848. 
Massive numbers of arrests made possible by the concentration of troops 
in disturbed areas in the North boosted the arrest totals by some 
thousands, thereby contributing to the spikes observable for those years. 
The most convincing evidence of the reduction of crime is the 
pattern set borough by borough, county by county. We will be content 
to present the evidence available for London, Leeds and the County of 
Lancashire.. London, the first city to acquire a full-time, paid police 
force, experienced a dramatic increase in the number of persons charged 
per 100,000 in the population in the decade following the introduction 
of police in the metropolitan area. The rise was greater than in the 
rest of the country, and was followed by a decade in which the crime rate 
declined to below the rate in the two decades preceding the introduction 
of police. During this later period, the number of persons charged per 
100,000 in the rest of England and Wales continued to rise. 
The county of Lancashire, for which we have a relatively complete 
set of data, illustrates what we take to be the impact.of -a slower 
buildup of police. Borough forces were established at intervals between 
1835 and 1857 (Liverpool's borough police force antedates by many decades 
the general buildup of police in England as a whole in the nineteenth 
century.) The Lancashire county police force was one of the earliest 
(1840) and one of the largest, consisting of 657 men by 1857 (Critchley 
1967: 141). While the county had a property crime rate consistently 
higher than England and Wales as a whole, the rate converged rapidly with 
the property crime rate for the rest of the county after 1850. In other 
words, after mid-century Lancashire was better policed than the rest of 
non-metropolitan England and also experienced a more rapidly.declining 
rate of property crime. 
Where figures are-available for other counties, they are sug- 
gestive of a similar pattern--an initial, rapid rise in the crime rate, 
followed by a decline, We know, for example, that of the counties which 
established county police in 1840, by the following year eight were 
among the twelve counties with the highest indictable committal rates 
(Gatrell and Hadden, 1972: 430). And these eight were by no means all 
urbanized or highly populous counties with traditionally high rates of 
crime. Under extreme conditions of repression in Lancashire and other 
. . - -  counties, the crime rate was wholly determined by the numbers of repres- 
sive forces amassed. Thus in 1812 and 1819 large numbers of arrests 
followed from the presence of large numbers of troops during "distur- 
bances." But in 1839 when Lancashire again experienced disturbances, 
in the absence of large numbers of the military, the disturbances did 
not become recorded in the crime rate. 
We have good evidence that short term fluctuations in crime 
rates,'as well as long term trends, were the product of changes in the 
local police establishment in Leeds. J.J. Tobias provides crime sta- 
tistics for the borough of Leeds between 1858 and 1876 (Tobias 1969: 
256-267).26 Tobias points to the changes in overall indictable com- 
mittal rate, particularly in years in which new police chiefs were 
appointed. Even more striking is the regular rise and fall in indict- 
able committal rates lagged about two years after each increase or 
decrease in the ratio of inhabitants to full-time police in the borough. 
The inhabitants/police ratio fell (more police) between 1863 and 1869 
and between 1872 and 1876. Between 1865 and 1869 the crime rate rose, 
followed by a decline beginning in 1870. In 1874 and 1875 crime again 
rose followed by a decline. The decline in crime in Leeds between 1870 
and 1873 no doubt was due in part to a decline in the size of the police 
force as well as to the earlier increase in policing. 
While the trends in the available data on property crimes support 
the hypothesis that policing produced first a rise and then a decline in 
the crime rate, policing.clearly does not explain all of the short term 
trends. In particular; in the 1880s, 1ong.after the general downward 
trend in the property crime rate had been established, there is a slight 
resurgence of the property crime rate. The nearly simultaneous fluctu- . 
ations in the economy are suggestive, but as we argued above, not an 
explanation in themselves. While the police were rapidly increasing 
in number and efficiency, clearly other factors were at work, factors 
which in the twentieth century produce very different trends from those 
at the end of the 19th, despite the continual improvement (we assume) 
in policing. In the 20th century, the rate of property crimes has 
steadily increased. Further, the trends which we predicted, and found, . 
. . in property crimes;do not hold for other types of crime. Crimes 
involving assaults do not begin to decline for England as'a whole until 
well after 1870. Lancashire also follows this pattern. 
Yet another contrast with property crime is provided by arrests 
for public drunkenness. We would expect arrest rates to be particularly 
sensitive to public concem with drunkenness, and we would not expect 
the behavior of those arrested to be modified by the probability of 
detection and arrest to the same extent as persons contemplating theft. 
Arrests for drunkenness rose until 1875, declined briefly, and rose 
again in the early 18809, declining and rising again toward 1900 but 
at no time dipping below the level reached in the early 1870s. No 
doubt the consistently high level of arrests during the latter part . ; .  
of the 19th century reflects in part the extent to which drunkenness 
had become an obsession of those deprecating and trying to reform 
working class life in the 1870s. It is apparent that each particular 
form of criminal behavior, and its corresponding "visible1' rate 
responded to a different set of conditions motivating the behavior, 
conditions creating opportunities for the behavior and conditions 
governing the 'rate at,which authorities reported and sanctioned the 
behavior. 
France 
The fundamental features of professional policing in France 
crystallized during the seventeenth century's great expansion of state 
power. The volume and intensity of policing, however, did not expand 
rapidly until the Revolution of 1789 and thereafter. The seventeenth- 
century system corresponded to the political needs of that turbulent 
period: it left the national army in charge of policing the provinces 
(especially their rural areas), and confined the policing of the major 
cities--at first Paris alone, then other cities--to special forces 
responsible to a minister in charge of internal security. In 1720 the 
war ministry created a distinct military f orce--the ~are/chausse/e--to 
0 # 
handle its routine domestic .policing. The Marechaussee was the ancestor 
of the Gendarmerie, which still has primary responsibility for the 
policing of rural areas and highways, and still reports to the Ministry 
of War. The Parisian police force, commanded by the Lieutenant &n;ral 
h 0 
from 1674 on, evolved into the Surete -Nationale; the ~$rete/ eventually 
covered all urban France with its net. 
. .. 
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Each of these forces has several subdivisions. They overlap a 
bit more than our description implies; for example, the Gendarmerie now 
has forces in Paris for ceremonies and for crowd control. A few local 
A 
forces, notably the gardes champetres of small towns, have always existed. 
Finally, the regular army has al- been on hand as a reserve force for 
crowd control. 
To some extent, the growing national forces supplanted or nation- 
alized local professional forces which were already active. The extent 
is probably large. For example, the state extended its control of muni- 
cipal police to.Lyon in 1851, to Marseille in 1908, to Toulon in 1918, 
to Nice in 1920; in each case it absorbed existing forces into the : 
national structure. As with measuring "political participation" 
exclusively through voting in national elections or measuring "produc- 
tion of goods and services" exclusively through their sale on the 
national market, the changes in policing we register by looking at the 
state's professionals have more than one component. They compound: 
1) professionalization of existing police activity, 2) nationalization 
of existing professional police activity, 3) increase in the total 
volume of professional police activity. 
With all these qualifications, we can still say that France 
has done the bulk of its professional policing for more than two 
centuries by means of two national forces, one concentrating in the 
cities, the other dealing with the rest of the country. At the present 
stage of research, the only information more or less continuously 
available over large blocks of time and space is information concerning 
the national forces. For that simple but compelling reason, we shall 
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confine our attention to the Surete Nationale and the Gendarmerie 
Nationale. 
The Expansion of Professional Policing in France 
More or less continuous data concerning the volume and structure 
of professional policing become available in the 1820s. We have summed 
up the chief nineteenth-century series which are now available in 
Figure 8.27 They include =he annual budget figures for gendarmerie 
'(within the Ministry of War) and for police (within the Ministry of 
the Interior). They also include the authorized numbers of gendarmes, 
on the one hand, and of cornrnissaires and agents, on the other. 
Although they are based on authorizations rather than actual performance 
during the year, the figures ought to represent changes in the overall I 
bulk oE the police forces fairly well. 
Figure 8 About Here 
- - - - - - - - - -  
From 1825 through 1900, the figures reveal a moderate expansion 
of the Gendarmerie, and a very large expansion of the police controlled 
by the Minister of the Interior. The Gendarmerie might have doubled in 
size; for the period in which we can directly observe troop strengths, 
however, the increase is only from about 16,000 to 21,000. The publishqd 
budget for police rose irregularly from 2 million in 1825 to 13 million 
in 1880, while police manpower rose more regularly from just under 
5,000 in 1848 to over 16,000 in 1900. At the end of the century, the 
Gendarmerie was still the larger force, but the police were gaining 
fast. Since the Gendarmerie had primary responsibility for the country- 
side and the Interior Ministry's police generally took.over the policing 
of the largest cities first, this probably means small cities and towns 
remained the least touched by the national police forces--and probably 
the least thoroughly policed in any regard. 
The curves of expansion have some interesting irregularities. . 
. . The trend of expenditure for the Gendarmerie was already upward in the 
, . 1840s. Louis Napoleon accelerated the expansion of the Gendarmerie 
during the first few years after. his seizure of power, then let the 
force level off. After a declining investment in Gendarmerie during the 
. . last years of the Second Empire, the regime which came to power in the 
1870 revolution again pumped strength into the force. The fluctuations 
A / 
in the Surete Nationale police were much greater. After each nineteenth- 
century revolution--1830, 1848, 1870--the regime which emerged consoli- 
dated its control over the country by vigorously expanding the police 
. . . .. . 
. . .  force. The partial exception to that rule is the Second Republic, 
.. from 1848 to 1851, which had cut expenditures in half before Louis 
, . 
Napoleon (who was President of the Republic before his 1851 coup set 
up the establishment of his Empire) tightened his grip on the state 
.. . .  
. . machinery. Shorter-run fluctuations in police strength depended to an 
important degree on the current political climate. 
Politics and Policing 
. . . . . .  In ~rance, the judicial system nationalized earlier than polic- 
ing did. Before the Revolution, the power to try and to punish lawbreakers 
was a kind of property; it resided in a great variety of organizations: 
royal courts, ecclesiastical courts, Parlements and others. With all 
kinds of property, the general work of the Revolution was to eliminate 
multiple claims on the same source of revenue, ideally to reduce the 
claimants to two: an individual and the national state. In the case 
of justice, the state took the lion's share. The reforms of the early 
  evolution consolidated most of the courts into a single hierarchy 
directly responsible--and responsive--to the state. Napoleon later 
reorganized the judicial system several times. He also greatly extended 
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the apparatus of political surveillance. 
After the Revolution and the Empire, the French sometimes reor- 
ganized a given level of the judicial system, added or subtracted special 
jurisdictions, employed military or mixed military-civilian courts to 
deal with people accused of participating in major insurrections, manipu- 
lated the political responsiveness and effectiveness of the judicial 
system. Yet on the whole a sfngle hierarchy stayed in place: cour de -- 
\ 
cassation, cour d'assaises, cour d'appel, tribunal de premiere instance, -
justice -- de paix, with minor changes of name and jurisdiction along the 
way. 
An effective, politically responsive judicial system combined 
with a widespread network of domestic espionage and a growing police 
establishment to provide the rulers of nineteenth-century France with 
extraordinary instruments of central control. The system had muscle. 
As Howard Payne puts it: 
If a 'police state' be defined as a national polity 
in which the executive possesses both the formal right 
to decree and the institutionalized means of enforcing 
arbitrary coercive measures without the approval of 
review of a 1egTslature or judiciary, then France before 
the Second Empfre displayed the elements of a 'police 
state.' The upheaval of 1848 brought only partial and 
momentary interruption of this 'normality.' Indeed, 
the apparent inability of the new republican order to 
conduct national affairs peacefully without central- 
ized administrative and police action led almost 
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immediately to the re-establishment and intensifi- 
cation of the traditional system (Payne 1966: 32). 
Louis Napoleon knowingly extended his control over the traditional 
system in the prepartion of his 1851 coup, then reinforced it in 
succeeding years. 
That reinforcement of the police apparatus in the face of a 
political threat was the general rule. From 1825 to 1900, the five 
years which brought the largest increases in the national expenditure 
for policing were 1831, 1852, 1860, 1868 and 1872. Three of them 
immediately followed a revolution or a coup. The other two canie in 
the aftermath of major threats to Louis Napoleon's regime. 
Accelerating and changing under the pressue of political events, 
the policing of France never.theless helped make nonpolitical crime 
visible. In terms of.sheer numbers of cases, the bulk of the nineteenth? 
. . 
century police effort went into the clearing of unwanted people from 
public places. That included intervention in some very political 
assemblies and demonstrations, but consisted mostly of apprehending 
vagabonds and beggars. In an intensive study of the police blotter and 
daily prefectoral reports for Paris in 1845, Catherine Paradeise 
arrived at the following estimates of the mean daily number of arrests 
in the city: 
vagrancy, begging 18.7 
property crimes 8.0 
- crimes against persons 
and public order 4.2 
sex crimes 0.9 
mentally disturbed 2.3 
abandoned children 1.0 
arrested by warrant 11.8 (Paradeise 1971: 14) 
In addition, there was a daily roundup of prostitutes (described, 
but not enumerated, by Paradeise). 
The arrests by warrant dealt with offenses the police had not 
observed directly, at least not on the day of the arrest; they were 
therefore, on the average, fairly serious offenses. The "property 
crimes," on the other hand, were mainly petty thefts and the "crimes 
against persons", mainly assaults. On the whole, then, routine 
policing of disorderly or undesirable people in public places produced 
most of the arrests that year. 
In 1845, at least, variations in the arrests for vagrancy and 
begging account for most of the fluctuation from month to month. And 
arrests for vagrancy and begging rose and fell with the level of 
unemployment in the city. A plausible interpretation is that unemploy- 
ment put more beggars and idlers on the street; an equally plausible , 
interpretation is that the police, encouraged by their superiors to 
watch for trouble in times of unemployment, used their discretion to 
get potential troublemakers off the street. 
The local spies of the Paris prefect of police sent in daily 
reports both on the state of the labor market and on the topics of 
conversation in the downtown squares where workers appeared daily for 
the shapeup. They were much atruned to the possibility that the workers 
would act on their grievances. The prefect's report for 22 October 1831 
contains this passage: 
Rain made the gatherings of workers at the Place de 
A 
~&ve and the Chatelet, as well as on the adjoining 
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quays, smaller than on the preceding days. The workers 
who came to those.gathering places were not saying 
anything against the government. However, a few of 
them complained about how long it was taking the 
government to fulfill its promises to them, and were 
surprised that the nature the work to be offered had 
not yet been announced, while others spoke with 
satisfaction about the work on the fortifications 
which they hoped would open up next week around 
~incennes' (Archives Nationales Flc I 33). 
In fact, most.of the daily reports in the rich series available from 
the 1830s to the 1850s include remarks on'the current temper of the 
city's workers. The implicit political analysis in these remarks was 
somewhat miscast: although the "vagabonds" picked up came dispro- 
I 
portionately from the unskilled and unemployed, the men who acted 
collectively against the government in the many Parisian insurrections 
of the period came disproportionately from the skilled trades (C; Tilly 
1970, lees and Tilly 1970). 28 The police found themselves dealing with 
very poor people most of the time. When the political heat rose, 
however, their.attention turned to a relatively integrated, organized, 
even comfortable segment of the working class. 
Trends in Recorded Crime in France 
In an unsurprising coincidence, detailed information on 
criminal activity for France as a whole became available about the 
same time as the proliferation of data on policing occurred. The 
/ 
launching of the annual Comptes generaux de l'administration de la - --
justice in the 1820s brought visible crime into the statistical age. 
The volumes bulge with cross-tabulations: types of offenders by' 
types of offense, penalties by jurisdiction, and so on. Although 
a few historians and a great many reformers and polemicists have. 
P # 
dipped into the Compte general, no one has so far used the source 
to reconstruct the overall transformation of recorded crime from the 
nineteenth to the twentieth century. Nor have we. We have only looked 
at the gross geographic pattern for selected years during the nineteenth 
century. 
The French distinguish three main levels of law violations: 
/ 
. . contraventions, delits and crimes. They correspond grossly to "infrac- , . 
. .  . 
tions," "misdemeanors" and "felonies," and fall roughly under the 
jurisdiction of justice - de pafx, tribunaux correctionnels and cours 
d'assises. Let us disregard infractions: traffic offenses, breaking 
of regulations for hunting, fishing and customs, and so on. In the 
1840s, French courts were charging about 115,000 persons per year with 
/ 
'delits or crimes. In that number were about 28,000 petty thefts, 
17,000 petty assaults, 10,000 cases of vagrancy and beggary, as compared 
with about 5,000 major property crimes and 2,000 major crimes against 
persons. By the 1890s, they were charging about 250,000 persons each 
year; that included some 50,000 petty thefts, 35,000 petty assaults, 
30,000 cases of vagrancy and beggary, 2,000 major property crimes and 
1,500 major crimes against persons (Annuaire statistique 1966: 161-164). 
- - - - - - - - - -  
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Figure 5 gives the details. It traces the nineteenth-century 
course of charges for four major categories: 1) major crimes against 
persons (chiefly homicide, aggravated assault and rape); 2) major crimes 
a g a i n s t  p rope r ty  (mainly b u r g l a r l y  and robbery) ;  3) p e t t y  t h e f t ;  
4) p e t t y  a s s a u l t .  It r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  f i g u r e s  a s  r a t e s  p e r  100,000 
popula t ion .  Seve ra l  t h i n g s  about t h e  t r e n d s  a r e  c l e a r  a t  once. F i r s t ,  
major and minor cr imes followed d i s t i n c t l y  d i f f e r e n t  pa ths .  Despi te  a  
r e v i v a l  i n  t h e  1870s, t h e  t r ends  of recorded major p rope r ty  cr imes r a n .  
d e c i s i v e l y  downward from t h e  1820s t o  t h e  end of t h e  century .  The r a t e  
dropped from about  16 p e r  100,000 popula t ion  t o  about 5. Recorded 
major pe r sona l  crimes subsided gen t ly  from about 4.2 t o  3.5, b u t  v i a  a  
roughly c u r v i l i n e a r  pa th  which reached i t s  h igh  p o i n t s  n e a r  1850 and 
1875. 
The r a t e s  of  bo th  c l a s s e s  of p e t t y  crime r o s e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
dur ing  t h e  century .  Recorded p e t t y  t h e f t s  ran  around 40 pe r  100,000 
i n  t h e  1820s, zoomed t o  over  100 by t h e  e a r l y  1850s, and swung around 
t h a t  l e v e l  f o r  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  century ,  Recorded p e t t y  a s s a u l t s  r o s e  
r a t h e r  c o n s i s t e n t l y  throughout t h e  per iod  f o r  which we have information:  
a l s o  around 40 p e r  100,000 i n  t h e  1820s, they  reached 90 i n  t h e  1890s. 
The d i p  i n  ,811 o f fenses  i n  1870 might be txought a  r e s u l l t  o f ' n a t i o n a l  
s o l i d a r i t y  du r ing  t h e  Franco-Prussian War; t h e  expe r t  au tho r s  of t h e  
Compte s&gral ,  however, a t t r i b u t e d  i t  t o  t h e  d i v e r s i o n  of p o l i c e  t o  
t h e  f r o n t  (Davidovitch 1970: 69) .  The two s t rong ,  cont inuous changes 
i n  t h e  graph a r e  t h e  d e c l i n e  of major p rope r ty  cr imes and t h e  r i s e  of 
p e t t y  a s s a u l t s .  The r i s e  of p e t t y  t h e f t s  i s  l a r g e  bu t  n o t  cont inuous,  
and t h e  d e c l i n e  of major crimes a g a i n s t  persons  no t  t e r r i b l y  d e c i s i v e .  
To l eave  t h e  t r e n d s  t h e r e  i s  a  b i t  misleading.  Recorded major 
crimes cont inued t o  d e c l i n e  a f t e r  1900, on ly  t o  s e t t l e  i n t o  t r e n d l e s s  
f l u c t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  1920s. Minor crimes, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, reached a  
peak i n  t h e  1890s. It would no t  be equa l l ed  u n t i l  t h e  1920s. Af t e r  
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t h e  1920s, minor crimes followed an i r r e g u l a r  downward t r end .  The 
t r a j e c t o r i e s  of i n d i v i d u a l  o f f enses  d i f f e r e d  q u i t e  a b i t  from one 
another .  For,example, charges of vagrancy and beggary reached t h e i r  
a l l - t ime  h igh  (around 35,000) i n  t h e  e a r l y  1890s. They remained 
important  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  few decades of t h e  twen t i e th  century ,  then  faded 
f a s t  around t h e  end of t h e  Depression. Charges f o r  p e t t y  t h e f t ,  i n  
c o n t r a s t ,  r o s e  i n s i s t e n t l y  i n t o  t h e  1920s, he ld  s t eady  up t o  World War 
11, and reached up beyond 160,000 dur ing  t h e  Nazi occupation. Even 
a f t e r  t h e  Nazis withdrew, charges f o r  p e t t y  t h e f t  were more f requent  
than  they  had eve r  been be fo re  t h e  war. The l i f e  h i s t o r i e s  of d i f f e r e n t  
. , . .  
of fenses ,  t h a t  is ,  v a r i e d  enough t o  make us  t h i n k  t h a t  we a r e  d e a l i n g  
wi th  more than  t h e  e f f e c t s  of long-run changes i n  r e p o r t i n g  procedures .  . . 
The number of people charged wi th  s e r i o u s  crimes dec l ined  . . 
. . 
p r e c i p i t o u s l y  from t h e  1840s t o  t h e  1890s. Th i s  does not  mean t h e  c a s e  . 
load  of t h e  cours  d ' a s s i s e s  a l s o  dec l ined .  I n  t h e  yea r s  of t h e  1840s, 
t h e  cours  d ' a s s i s e s  were t y p i c a l l y  d e a l i n g  wi th  about 100,000 cases .  
Of these ,  they  brought no charges i n  c l o s e  t o  75,000 cases ,  dropped t h e  
charges i n  another  20,000 t o  25,000, a c t u a l l y  t r i e d  j u s t  over 7,000 
persons,  and convicted between 4,500 and 5,000. I n  t h e  1 8 9 0 ~ ~  t h e s c o r e  
ran: t o t a l  ca ses  290,000 o r  so ,  no charges 275,000, dropped charges 
11,000, t r i e d  3 t o  4 thousand, convicted 2,500. The number of ca ses  
almost t r i p l e d  whi le  t h e  number of t r i a l s  dropped by h a l f .  
The gross s t a t i s t i c s  lend themselves t o  r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .  The number of ca ses  brought  t o  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  of 
t h e s e  s u p e r i o r  c o u r t s  sugges ts  a g r e a t  r i s e  i n  t h e  prevalence of 
s e r i o u s  crime. The number of persons charged sugges ts  a dramat ic  
d e c l i n e  i n  s e r i o u s  crime. I f  we read  t h e  number of ca ses  a s  an 
i n d i c a t o r  of recorded crime, w e  can e a s i l y  draw t h e  conclus ion  t h a t  t h e  
p o l i c e  and t h e  c o u r t s  were becoming l e s s  e f f e c t i v e  a t  apprehending . . 
c r imina l s .  Yet t h e i r  capac i ty  f o r  record ing  complaints  a p p a r e n t l y . r o s e  
enormously, and t h e i r  r a t e  of convic t ion  f o r  persons  brought  t o  t r i a l  
d i d  n o t  a l t e r  ve ry  much, This  i n t e r e s t i n g  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  has  i n s p i r e d  
Boudon and Davidovitch t o  argue t h a t  t h e  f l ood  of complaints  l e d  t h e  
c o u r t s  t o  behave a s  any reasonable  o rgan iza t ion  would: by a l t e r i n g  t h e  
p a t t e r n  of d i s p o s i t i o n  of complaints ,  They s h i f t e d  toward t h e  e a s i e r  
method: r e g i s t e r i n g  t h e  complaint,  b u t  b r ing ing  no charges.  
Qui te  l i k e l y ,  important  changes i n  t h e  way t h e  c o u r t s  disposed 
of complaints  occurred dur ing  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  century .  We a r e  i n c l i n e d ,  
however, t o  two i n t e r p r e t a t f o n s  which do n o t  ag ree  p e r f e c t l y  wi th  those  
of Boudon and Davidovitch: a )  We sugges t  t h a t  t h e  t r i p l i n g  of ca ses  
be fo re  t h e  a s s i z e s  was due l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  inc reased  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of 
p o l i c e ;  t h e  number of p o l i c e  wi th  whom complaints  could be  lodged a l s o  
t r i p l e d .  b).,We sugges t  t h a t  t h e  d e c l i n i n g  recordfng  of major crimes-- 
e s p e c i a l l y  p rope r ty  c r imes- - re f lec ts  a  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e i r  " t rue"  preva- 
l e n c e  a s  a  consequence of i n t e n s i f i e d  p o l i c i n g .  
To make a l l  t h e  t r ends  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  our  gene ra l  argument, 
.we.would have t o  show t h a t  p o l i c i n g  was a l r e a d y  depress ing  t h e  " t rue"  
prevalence of major prbper ty  crimes by t h e  1820s, and had a  much 
s t r o n g e r  e f f e c t  on t h e  v i s i b i l i t y  than  on t h e  " t rue"  preva lence  of 
p e t t y  t h e f t s  up t o  t h e  1850s. By our  argument, t h e  cons ide rab le  r i s e  
i n  p e t t y  a s s a u l t s  is  due t o  t h e i r  excep t iona l ly  i n c r e a s i n g  v i s i b i l i t y  
a s  p o l i c i n g  expands. The mild r i s e  and g e n t l e  d e c l i n e  of major personal  
crimes n e i t h e r  cha l l enges  nor co r robora t e s  our  argument. We don ' t  have 
d e f i n i t i v e  evidence on any of t h e s e  p o i n t s .  Y e t  s e v e r a l  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  
t r e n d s  suppor t  t h e  gene ra l  argument, 
First, the findings of an intensive analysis of regional 
patterns from 1831 to 1861 are consfstent with our strong emphasis on. 
policing (see Lodhi and Tilly 1973). Our census-by-census study 
revealed a strong statistical relationship between the urbanity of the 
department and its visible level of major property crime; the association- 
with industrial activity was mildly negative, the associations with the 
. . 
current rates of urban growth and of in-migration weak and inconsistent. 
Major crimes against persons showed no consistent relationships with any 
of these variables. That much of the analysis indicates that something 
about the structure of urban areas as such (rather than, say, the current.. . ' 
. . 
pace of change) promotes visible property crime. We think it is the set 
of factors in our earlier checklist: the extent to which urban property 
is controlled by individuals and small groups, the high necessity of 
property for valued activities in urban areas, the fact that the urban 
propertyless do not tend to live under the immediate surveillance of 
the propertied, and the relatively high accessibility and mobility of 
valued urban property. 
Our last factor--the prevailing estimates of the cost of appre- 
hension--varies more rapidly than the others. We think the intensity 
of policing significantly affects those estimates. In rough corroboration? 
we find that in the period from 1831 to 1861 charges for major property 
crimes declined most rapidly in departments with more than 15 percent of 
their population in cities of 10,000 or more (where the police forces of 
the Interior Ministry were expanding rapidly), more slowly in the most 
rural departments (where the Gendarmerie was growing at a more leisurely 
pace), most slowly of all in the departments in between (which were the 
last to acquire extensive professional policing). We don't have the 
necessary detailed information on the emplacement and patrolling practi- 
ces of departmental police forces; the information is there, embedded 
in the police archives, but will take a great deal of labor to dig out. 
At least the limited amount we do know is consistent with our general 
argument. 
Second, the year-by-year fluctuation of visible crime in the 
nineteenth century indicates a significant relationship between policing 
and property crime. Table 4 presents zero-order correlation coefficients ' ' 
for all pairs of the variables we have discussed so far. (Each correla- 
tion covers all years for which we have observations on both variables 
. in Figures 4 and 5.) We include time as a variable to catch the linear 
component of trend. 
- - - - - - - - - -  
, Table 4 About Here 
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Clearly, all the variables have definite trends. Most of them 
are very strong; all but major personal crimes have correlations with 
time of .85 or more. All the policing variables plus the two forms 
of petty crime display strong tendencies to rise continuously over 
time, while major property crimes display an equally strong tendency 
to fall continuously over time. Major personal crimes, as we have 
already seen, describe a gentle arc; its downward tendency is still 
marked enough to produce a correlation with time of -.44. 
The strong common trends inflate the correlations in the 
remainder of the table, Nevertheless, interesting relationships stand 
out: the reassuringly high correlations among the policing variables, . - 
the powerful -.89 and -.95 correlations between major property crimes 
and the numbers of gendarmes and police, the generally stronger association 
Table. 4 
Zero-Order Correlations of Annual Measures of 
Policing and Visible Crime, 
Various Years 1828-1900 
Major Major Petty Petty N N Gend Policq 
Variable Time Pers Prop Assault Theft Gend Police Budget Budget 
Time 1.0 - . 4 4  -.86 .91 .85 .91 .97 .85 .?I 
Major Crimes 













of.crime frequencies with numbers of professional police than with the 
overall budget for policing. Although the table leaves moot the mechanisms 
involved, it provides consistent evidence of strong relationships between 
.fluctuations in policing and fluetuarions in visible crime. It indicates 
that major property crimes are most strongly affected of all. 
Some simple multiple regressions will help separate the effects 
of common trend from the effects of policing. In orderto do the statis- 
tical analysis, we ,have' to narrow our attention to the 26 years for which 
.we have observations on the crime frequencies plus numbers of police and 
of gendarmes. Expressed in standardized partial regression coefficients, 
the basic equations are: 
* 
1) major personal crimes = .26 (Number of gendarmes) + 1.05 
(number of police) - 2.07* (time) R2 = .88 
2) major property crimes = .30 (time) - .22 
(gendarmes) - .61* (police) R2 = -96 
* 
3) petty assaults = 1.2 (time) - .20 
(gendarmes) - .85 (police) R2 = -96 
4) petty thefts = 1.15 (time) + .23 (gendarmes) 
- .65 (police) R2 = .73 
.(The starred coefficients are more than twice their standard errors.) 
*at we make of the equations depends on our interpretation of the 
time variable. Since.we are already aware of the very strong tendency 
of policing to rise continuously over time, we consider "time"to repre- 
sent the long-run effects of expanded policing as.well as all the other 
continuous changes which affected the incentives to criminal behavior 
during the nineteenth century: urbanization, changing distributions of 
property and so on. In these equations, the numbers of gendarmes and 
of police then single out the effects of deviations from the main trend. 
With that understanding, the equations are illuminating. True, 
,.the results for petty thefts are indeterminate: none of the individual 
coefficients is large enough to rely on, the coefficients for gendarmes 
2 
and police point in different directions, and the overall R is lower than 
in the other equations. The three remaining equations fit the observed 
distributions very well. We discover a long-run tendency for structural 
.change and expanded policing to depress visible major personal crimes, 
countered by a short run tendency for increases in gendarmes and 
(especially) police to promote their visibility. Visible petty assaults 
move upward with structural change and police expansion over the long 
run, but respond negatively to short run increases in gendarmes and 
(again, especially) police. Finally, major property crimes have a weak 
tendency to rise over the long run of police expansion, strongly counter- 
acted by the tendency for increasing numbers of gendarmes and (once 
more, especially) police to depress them in the short run. 
Obviously, the discussion can't end there. In order to make 
this sort of analysis definitive, we need to deal with longer series, 
and to disaggregate the "time" variable into its hypothetical componentq: 
long-run changes.in police practice, urbanization, changing distributions 
of property, and so on. It would be valuable to investigate the corresr 
pondence between the geography of visible crime and the fine geography 
of policing. It is essential to get a firmer grip on the whole policing 
process, from surveillance to the reporting of offenses to the judicial 
treatment of accused criminals. We need a serious effort to disentangle 
the effects of policing on the frequency of prohibited behavior from 
its effects on the visibility of the prohibited behavior which does occur. 
In the meantime, the results from nineteenth-century France.tel1 us that 
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changing policing had significanc effects on visible crime, especially 
major crimes against property. 
Conclusions 
The evidence from Canada is either moot or negative, the evidence 
from the United States mixed, the evidence from England and France 
encouraging but far from decisive. In the U. S . , ~ n ~ l a n d  and France., we 
find some interesting indications that intensified policing did, indeed, . 
have the paradoxical effects about which we theorized at the outset: 
depressing the true prevalence of crimes against property, but also 
making those property crimes which occurred more visible. In all four 
countries, the rising incentives to property crime in the twentieth 
. . 
century appear to have swallowed up the effects of policing. Our con- . . . . . . . . 
. . 
clusion is not that policing lost its effect; it is that contrary forces 
overwhelmed that effect. 
. . 
. . 
Our approach makes the difficulties of interpreting official . . 
crime statistics all the more vivid. The analyses of England and France 
indicate that we can get somewhere with careful statistical analyses of 
substantial time series on policing and crime. However, the main agenda 
turns out.to be the documentation and measurement of policing itself. 
We need reliable indications of changes in the definition, apprehension 
and reporting of criminal activity. We need information concerning the 
personnel--professional, semi-professional and amateur--invoZved in 
policing. It would be extremely useful to be able to pinpoint varia- 
tions in the character and intensity of police surveillance over the 
general population. If we had this sort of information about policing, 
even in the ahsence of direct and independent measures of the "true" 
prevalence of crime, we would have the means of distinguishing between 
the determinants of criminal activity as such and the determinants pf 
it? visibility. 
Table A-1 
Convict ions f o r  Offenses ( I n d i c t a b l e  and   on-~ndictable) 
i n  Canada, 1876-1921 
. . Proper ty  Proper ty  T o t a l  of 
Offenses Against  wi th  Without Criminal. 
t h e  Person Violence Violence Offenses* 
Table A-1 Continued 
Property 
Offense$ Against with 








includes other felonies and misdemeanors not listed above 
Source: Statistics of Criminal and Other Offenses, p. 228. 
Table A-2 
Convict ions f o r  I n d i c t a b l e  Offenses f o r  
Canada 1886-1921 
Property Proper ty  Total: of 
Offenses Against w i th  Without Criminal, 
t h e  Person Violence Violence Offenses 
* 
T o t a l  i nc ludes  malacious o f f enses  a g a i n s t  p rope r ty ,  fo rge ry  and 
o f f e n s e s  a g a i n s t  currency and o t h e r  i n d i c t a b l e  off ,enses  n o t  
inc luded  i n  above c a t e g o r i e s .  
Source : 
N = a b s o l u t e  number r = rate/100,000 popula t ion  
Table A-3 
Year 
Crime Rates in England (per 100,000 pop.) 
England and Wales Lancashire 
+,  
* * 
All Non-Violent ~ l l *  Non-Vi~lent* 
Serious Property Serious property 
Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes 
Males Females Males Females 
Table A-3 Continued 
. . . . 
. "  England and Wales 
A l l *  Non-Violent* A l l *  Nqn-Violent* 
Se r ious  Proper ty  S e r i o u s  Proper ty  
Crimes Crimes Crimes C r ' ime s 
Year Males Females Males Females 
Table A-3 Continued 
All* Non-Violent* All* Non-Violept* 
Serious Property Serious Property 
Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes 
Year - Males Females Males Females 
* 
For 1805-1834, figures represent all indictable committals 
For 1835-1856, figures represent indictable committals plus summary 
(petty session) 
For 1857-1892, figures represent indictable committals plu$ all petty 
session trials. 
Sources: Gatrell and Hadden, pp. 387-396. Lancashire statistics for 
selected years 1805-1834 were compiled from archival sources. Assize 
indictments were taken from clerk of the Crown Minutes in the Public 
Record Office (P.L.26). Quarter Sessions Indictments were examiped 
at the Lancashire Record Office. 
Table A-4 
Rates of Policing and of Vis ible  Crime i n  France 1828-1900 
(All  Are Rates Per 100,000 Population) 
Numberof Number of Major Crimes Majorcrimes Petty Petty 
Police Gendarmes vs .  Persons v s .  Property Assaults Thefts 
Year 
Table A-4 Continued 
I 
Number of Number of Major Crimes Major Crimes Petty Petty 
Police Gendarmes vs. Persons vs. Property Assaults ThefGs 
Year 




FIGURE 2 - 
RATES OF CONVICTION FOR INDICTABLE OFFENSES 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. That i t  s h a l l  and may be  lawful  f o r  t h e  s a i d  Corporat ion from time 
t o  t ime t o  e s t a b l i s h  such ordinances,  by-laws and r e g u l a t i o n s ,  a s  
they may t h i n k  reasonable  i n  t h e  s a f d  Town, t o  r e g u l a t e  t h e  License 
Vic tua l l inghouses  and Ordinar ies ,  where f r u i t ,  v i c t u a l s  and l i q u o u r s ,  
n o t  d i s t i l l e d ,  s h a l l  be  s o l d ,  t o  be  ea t en  o r  drunk i n  such houses 
o r  g r o c e r i e s ;  t o  r e g u l a t e  Wharves and Quays; t o  r e g u l a t e  t he  weigh- 
i ng  of Hay, measuring of Wood; t o  r e g u l a t e  Ca r t s  and Carmen; t o  regu- 
l a t e  Slaughter-houses; t o  prevent  t h e  f i r i n g  of any Guns, Muskets, 
P i s t o l s ,  Squibs and F i r e b a l l s ,  o r  i n j u r i n g  o r  des t roy ing  Trees 
p l an ted  o r  drawing f o r  shade o r  ornament i n  t h e  s a i d  Town; t o  pre- 
ven t  t h e  p u l l i n g  down o r  defac ing  of Sign-boards, o r  i n s c r i b i n g  
o r  drawing any indecent  words, f i g u r e s  o r  p i c t u r e s  on any bu i ld ing ,  
w a l l ,  f ence  o r  o t h e r  pub l i c  place; and g e n e r a l l y  t o  prevent  v i c e  
and p re se rve  good o r d e r  i n  t h e  s a i d  Town; t o  e n t e r  i n t o  and examine' 
a l l  Dtrelling-houses, Ware-houses, Shops, Yards and outhouses,  t o  
a s c e r t a i n  whether any such p l aces  a r e  i n  a dangerous s t a t e  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  f i r e s ,  and t o  d i r e c t  them t o  b e  pu t  9n a  s a f e  and secu re  
condi t ion ;  t o  appo in t  Fire-Wardens and F i r e  Engineers;  t o  appoin t  
and remove F i r e  Men; t o  make s u r e  r u l e s  and by-laws a s  may be  
thought expedient  f o r  t h e  conduct of  such  F f r e  Companies a s  may 
be  r a i s e d  w i t h  t h e  s a n c t i o n  of t h e  s a i d  Corporat ion;  t o  compel1 any 
person t o  a i d  i n  t h e  extinguishment of any F i r e ;  t o  r e q u i r e  t h e  
I n h a b i t a n t s  t o  provide  and keep f i r e -bucke t s  and s c u t t e l s ,  and 
l a d d e r s  t o  t h e i r  houses;  t o  s top ,  o r  a u t h o r i s e  any o t h e r  person t o  
s t o p ,  any one r i d i n g  o r  d r i v i n g  immoderately i n  any S t r e e t ,  o r  r i d -  
i ng  o r  d r i v i n g  on any Side-walk, o r  t o  i n f l i c t  f i n e s  f o r  any such 
of fence ;  t o  r e g u l a t e  t h e  Ass ize  of Bread; t o  prevent  and a b a t e  and 
remove any nuisances ;  t o  r e s t r a i n  and prevent  any  ho r ses ,  c a t t l e  o r  
swine, from running a t  l a r g e ;  t o  p reven t  and remove encroachments 
i n  any S t r e e t ,  and t o  make such r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s  from t h e  
improvement, good o rde r  and government of t h e  s a i d  Town a s  t he  s a i d  
Corporat ion may deem expedient ,  no t  repugnant t o  t h e  laws of t h i s  
Province,  except  i n  s o  f a r  a s  t h e  same may b e  v i r t u a l l y  repea led  
by t h i s  Act; and t o  enforce  t h e  due observance thereof  by i n f l i c t -  
ing  p e n a l t i e s  on any person f o r  t h e  v i o l a t i o n  of any by-law o r  or- 
dinance of t h e  s a i d  Corporation, n o t  exceeding one pound t e n  s h i l -  
l i n g s .  (Quoted i n  Ai tch ison  1953: 568-69). 
2 .  Nicolas  Zay h a s  w r i t t e n  a very  comprehensive account of sources of 
s t a t i s t i c s  on cr ime providing informat ion  and d e s c r i p t i o n  of t hese  . , 
sources .  He a l s o  thoroughly d i s c u s s e s  s p e c i f i c  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and 
problems a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  s t a t i s t i c s  on  crime i n  Canada e s p e c i a l l y  
when we want t o  look a t  h i s t o r i c a l  and comparative t r ends .  See 
Nicolas  Zay; Sec t ion  V: J u s t i c e ;  i n  M. C.  Urquhart and K . . A .  H. 
Buckley H i s t o r i c a l  S t a t i s t i c s  of Canada, Cambridge; The Univers i ty  
P r e s s ,  1965, pp. 634-59. 
3. Offences a g a i n s t  p roper ty  wi th  v i o l e n c e  r e f e r  t o  breaking and en ter -  
i ng ,  r o b b e r i e s  and e x t o r t  ion. Offences a g a i n s t  p rope r ty  without.  
v io l ence  inc lude  a v a r i e t y  of cr imes a g a i n s t  property. ,  f raud ,  em- 
bezzlement,  f a l s e  pre tences ,  r e c e i v i n g  s t o l e n  goods, and va r ious  
forms of t h e f t s .  An i n d i c t a b l e  o f f e n c e  i s  considered an- of fence  
a g a i n s t  t h e  whole s t a t e  a s  we l l  a s  a g a i n s t  persons and/or  proper ty .  
Before 1955, t h e f t s  were def ined  i n d i c t a b l e  o r  non-indictable  
according t o  t h e  v a l u e  of t h e  s t o l e n  goods (Urquhart 1965: 636). 
J u v e n i l e  and a d u l t  conv ic t ions  were counted toge the r  t o  1921 and 
s i n c e  1922 j u v e n i l e  convic t ions  were s e p a r a t e l y  repor ted .  
The d a t a  pose a  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  comparing t h e  t r end  b e f o r e  
and s i n c e  1922. A r a t e  computed on t h e  b a s i s  of t o t a l  popu la t ion  
f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  per fod  (1886-1946) being examined w i l l  d i s t o r t  t h e  
t rend .  For example i n  1922 the  rate/100,000 suddenly drops t o  
176 from 221 i n  t h e  preceding year .  ( S t a t i s t i c s  of Criminal and 
Other Offences 1946). This  d e c l i n e  c e r t a i n l y  could l eave  an  impression 
on t h e  r eade r  of t h e  t a b l e  f o r  above source  t h a t  c r i m i n a l i t y  de- 
c l i ned ,  which i s  no t  c o r r e c t .  I n  our  judgment one way t o  overcome 
t h i s  problem was t o  compute t h e  r a t e s  of crime a f t e r  1922 us ing  
a d u l t  popula t ion ,  t h a t  is,  16  yea r s  a n d , o v e r ,  We have done s o  know- 
ing  t h a t  t h e  r a t e s  c a l c u l a t e d  i n  t h i s  way would now become s l i g h t l y  
i n f l a t e d  i n  comparison w i t h  the  r a t e s  p r i o r  t o  1929 because t o t a l  
popu la t ion  a s  denominator inc ludes  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  s i z e  of very  young 
p p p u l a ~ 4 o n  e s p e c i a l l y  below 5 yea r s  of age, and 5-9 a s  w e l l ,  which 
under normal circumstances would remain cons t an t .  Given t h i s  prob- 
lem Q£ s l i g h t  i n f l a t i o n ,  t h e  r a t e  computed i n  t h i s  manner a l low us 
t o  achieve  maximum comparabi l i ty .  See Richard Maxwell Brown, "The 
F e r i c a n  V i g i l a n t e  T rad i t i on"  i n  Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert 
Gurr ( eds . ) ,  Violence i n  America: H i s t o r i c a l  and Comparative Per- 
- .  . 
s p e c t i v e s ,  New York: Bantam Books, 1969, 
4 .  On p o l i c e  a c t i o n  by t h e  U.S. m i l i t a r y  i n  t he  n ine t een th  century  s e e ,  
Marl in  S .  Reid i ley ,  Federa l  M i l i t a r y  I n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  C i v i l  Dis tur -  
bances,  Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n ,  Georgetown Unive r s i t y ,  1939. Accounts 
of the m i l i t i a  a r e  o f t e n  euphemistic about t h e  p o l i c i n g  r o l e ,  and 
no t  based on c l o s e  a n a l y s i s ,  5.g.   art ha Derthick; The National.  
Guard i n  P o l i t i c s ,  Cambrldge, Mass.: Harvard Univers i ty  P re s s ,  
1965. A:f.ine, r i c h  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  m i l i t i a  i n  one i n f l u e n t i a l  . 
s t a t e ,  is  provided by Joseph John Holmes, The 'Nat iona l  Guar.d of 
Pennsylvania: Policemen. of Industry;1865-1905, Ph.D. d i s se r t a - .  
t i o n ,  Univers i ty  of Connect icut ,  1971. 
5. General p i c t u r e s  of t h e  Federa l  P o l i c e  i n  t h e  n ine t een th  century  
a r e  contained i n :  A. C.  Millspaugh, Crime Control  by t h e  Nat iona l  
Government, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n ,  1937; 
A lbe r t  Lange lu t t i g ,  "Federal  Pol ice",  The Annals, November 1929, 
pp. 41-53; Bruce Smith, P o l i c e  Systems i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  New 
York: Harpers,  1940. 
6. On s t a t e  p o l i c e  s ee :  Mil ton Chernin, S t a t e  P o l i c e ,  Berkeley, 1934; 
David G. Monroe, S t a t e  and P r o v i n c i a l  Po l i ce :  A Study i n  P o l i c e  
Funct ioning i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  and Canada, Evanston, I l l i n o i s ,  
1941; Bruce Smith, The S t a t e  P o l i c e ,  New York: Macmillan, 1925. 
7. See: Raymond Moley, P o l i t i c s  and Criminal  Prosecut ion ,  New York: 
Minton, Ba1cI-i and Co., 1929, and "The S h e r i f f  and t h e  Constable'! 
i n  The Annals, November 1929, pp. 28-33; Bruce Smith, Rural  Crime : - 
1 
Contro l ,  New York: Macmillan, 1929. 
8. Stud ie s  of p o l i c e  i n  n ine t een th  cen tu ry  American c i t i e s  inc lude :  
Selden Bacon, The Ear ly  Development of American Municipal Po l i ce :  
A Study of t he  Evolut ion of Formal Cont ro l  i n  a  Changing Society;  
Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  Yale Univers i ty ,  1939; Theodore Ferdinand, "The 
Criminal Courts of Boston Since 1849," American Jou rna l  of Sociology, 
73, No. 1, (Ju ly  1967),  pp. 84-99, " P o l i t i c s ,  The P o l i c e  and Arres t -  
i n g  P o l i c i e s  i n  Salem, Massachuset ts  S ince  the  C i v i l  War," S o c i a l  
Problems, Vol. 19, Spring 1972, pp. 572-588, "Criminality, The Courts, 
and the Constabulary in Boston: 1703-1967,'' Northern Illinois Univer- 
sity, unpublished manuscript, 1973; David R. Johnson, The Search for 
an Urban Discipline: - - .  Police Reform as a Response io Crime in Ameri- 
can Cities, - 1800-1895; Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 
1972; Gleorge A. Ketcham, Municipal Police Reform: A Comparative 
Study of Law Enforcement .. - in Cincinnati, Chicago, New Orleans, New 
York and St. Louis, 1844-1877, Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Missouri, 1967; Roger Lane, Policing the'city: Boston 1822-1885, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967; Allan Levett, 
Centralization of City Police in the Nineteenth Century United States, 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan,l974; John K. Manilia, 
The Mobility of Elites in a Bureaucratizing Organization: The St. 
Louis Police Department 1861-1961, Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Mtchigan, 1970; James F. Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial 
Times to 1901, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970; Eugene F. 
Rider, The Denver Police Department, Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Denver, 1971. 
9! The private police in the United States have not, to our knowledge, 
been given the serious scholarly attention their important role, es- 
pecially in the nineteenth century, would seem to deserve. A begin- 
ning is made in J. P. Shalloo, Private Police: With Special Reference 
to Pennsylvania, American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1933. 
10: Cited in J. Thomas Scharf, History of St. Louis City and County, from 
the Earliest Periods to the Present Day, (2 Vols.) St. Louis, 1883, 
p. 148. U.S. Senate "Pinkerton's National Detective Agency and its 
Connection with the Labor Troubles at Homestead, Pennsylvania," Wash-.. 
ington D.C., Report No. 2447, 52nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1893. 
. .
11. The d a t a  f o r  Boston, S t .  Louis and  an Francisco a r e  from Annual 
P o l i c e  Reports.  The Denver mater5al  d e r i v e s  from Denver C i ty  Direc- 
. .  t o r i e s .  
12 .  The b a s i s  f o r  t h e  ckolee  of t hese  e i t l e s  and a f u l l e r  account of 
e a r l y  p o l i c e  development i n  fhem is contained i n  Leve t t ,  1974. 
Donald ;T. Black, P o l i c e  Encour i fe rs~and 'Socia1  Organizat ion:  An --- . - -.- . 
Observat ion - .Study,' -- Ph.,D. d2ssertation,.University of Michigan, 1968, 
p. 45. See a l s o ,  A lbe r t  J. Reiss ,  Jr., The P o l i c e  and The Pub l i c ,  
New Haven: Yale Univers i ty ,  1971. 
13. This  account of p o l i c e  o rgan iza t ion  i n  Boston d e r i v e s  from Lane, 
14. A d e t a i l e d  d e s c r i p t i o n  of t he  Ph i l ade lph ia  P o l i c e  Department, es- 
p e c i a l l y  r i c h  f o r  t h e  per iod  1857-1887, i s  provided i n  H. 0 .  Sprogle,  
The Ph i l ade lph ia  P o l i c e ,  P a s t  and P resen t ,  Ph i l ade lph ia ,  1887. 
15.  Tobias a t t empt s  an  assessment of crime t r ends  i n  t h e  n ine t een th  cen- 
t u r y  r e l y i n g  e n t i r e l y  on anecdota l  sources .  He has  merely e l ec t ed  
an  i m p l i c i t  b i a s  over  a n  e x p l i c i t  one. Af te r  a l l  most of h i s  anec- 
d o t a l  sources  a r e  persons whose c o n t a c t s  w i t h  t h e  c r imina l  world 
comprise a  f a r  sma l l e r  s e l e c t i o n  from t h e  "actual"  and a  f a r  l e s s  
sys t ema t i c  one than t h e  records  kep t  by t h e  Home Secre ta ry .  
16. I t  i s  r e a s s u r i n g  a t  t h i s  po in t  t o  no te  t h a t  anecdota l  in format ion  
accumulated by Tobias confirms t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l -  p r o f i l e .  I n  s p i t e  
of t h i s ,  t h e  argument t h a t  crime h a s  r i s e n  con t inua l ly  s i n c e  t h e  
. . 
advent of r a p i d  u rban iza t ion  and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  i n  w e s t e r n -  . 
Europe has  i t s  proponents;.. A l ead ing  B r i t i s h  c r iminologis t , .Leon 
Radzinowicz, main ta ins  t h a t  t h e  "opt imis t ic"  view of crime c o n t r o l ,  
was l a r g e l y  destroyed by the  experience of t h e  
n i n e t e e n t h  century .  Cr imina l i t y  i n  France nea r ly  
t r e b l e d  and t h e  inc idence  of r ec id iv i sm doubled. 
I f  t h e  upward t r end  i n  England was h e l d  back f o r  
a  time, t h a t  was only because the n a t u r a l  sou rces  
of delinquency were a r t i f i c l a l l p  dep le t ed  by t h e  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of more than 150,000 o f f ende r s  over- 
s e a s .  . . .More than  halfway through t h e  (20th) 
century w e j s t i l l  s e e  no s i g n s  of t u rn ing  t h e  
t i d e .  (Radzinowicz 1966: 60-1) 
Radzinowicz a rgues  t h a t  crime r a t e s  a r e  a  s imple  monotonic i nc reas -  
i ng  fpnc t ion  of modernity. Even i f  we were no t  prepared t o  chal-  
l enge  h i s  argument w i t h  d a t a  of our  o m  t h e r e  a r e  s e r i o u s  problems 
wi th  h i s  ve r s ion  of i t .  The theory t h a t  crime o r i g i n a t e s  i n  a  
de l inquent  subcu l tu re  has  never been advanced on s o  broad a  b a s i s ,  
even by i ts  o r i g i n a t o r ,  Sutherland. Moreover, t h e  very  f a c t  t h a t  
of t h e  150,000 o r  so  t r anspor t ed ,  most were s e n t  abroad s e v e r a l  
gene ra t ions  be fo re  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  cr ime makes h i s  explana t ion  of 
t h e  d e c l i n e  r e f l e c t e d  i n  crime r a t e s  implaus ib le .  We doubt t h a t  
n ine t een th  century  t r ends  i n  crime a r e  a s  elementary a f u n c t i o n  of  
t h e  qdvance of s o c i e t y  a s  Radzinowicz argues.  
17 ,  They employ t h e  Gayer, Rostow, and Schwartz index of t h e  bus ines s  
c y c l e  between 1820 and 1850 (Gayer, Rostow and Schwartz - 1953: 355).  
Fgr subsequent yea r s  they r e l y  on t h e  c ruder  assessment of t r ends  pub- 
l i s h e d  by Rostow i n  B r i t i s h  Economy of t h e  Nineteenth Century (Ros- 
tow 1848: 33).  -
18. The c o r r e l a t i o n  i s  nega t ive  showing h igh  crime r a t e s  only s l i g h t l y  
c o r r e l a t e d  wi th  low bus ines s  cyc l e  index s c o r e s  (low sco res  mean 
. . 
' , depyg*sion), Gatrell and Hadden are misled by their reliasce on 
. . .  
. . 
. visual comparison. Movements, such as the Chartists, emerged in 
some depqessed periods, but not in all. At such times increased - I 
relTreFgion 'made available increased nuinbers of persons who could 
qake arrests for all types of crimes, such as special constables. 
19. While Thopas did not employ the same means of' correcting -for the . . . . .  . 
e~paneiop 'of summary jurisdiction, she we, aware of the problem and 
! . 
. . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . .  . .  . . 
: . , . ,  , 
accpsdingly~ broke the statistics into periods between administrative 
. .  . , . . . .  . 
. .. , . . ,. , ... . . . . .  . . . . . , . . . . . .  . . . ,  , . .  ;.: . . . . . . . . . ... . , .  . ', change? Her lagged correlation (two years) rose .to f 53. 
. . ! . . 
20, The Thppes River Police are an exceptiop to the pattern. Founded , -  
in 1800 they were under the jurisdiction of The Home Office (Coitchley 
1967: 42). 
21, For examp$e, in 1812, some 12,000 troops were concentrated in York- 
shire during the Liddite disturbances. In 1842 and 1848, thousand8 
of troops assisted in the suppressing of Chartist assemblies and 
riot@ /n Lancashire. 
22, Alfogefher some 40 police acts were passed in the 90 years between 
1829 and 1919. 
23, The pattgrn of police reform in unincorporated towns before the 
Yynic$pa) Corporations Act had been to create statuatory improve7 
aients coqrmissions, giving them jurisdiction over the night watch, 
. but npt over the day police, which were dsually under the control 
of an ancient local governmental institution, such as a court leet. 
Other measures have been suggested as being more appropriate than 
!erg n w b ~ r s  ?f police, Since foot patrols were the primary if 
/ . . 
not tpesole means of policing, and public surveillance practically 
the sple function of the early full-time police, the area covered 
by a  town was more important  than  t h e  number of i n h a b i t a n t s  p e r  
. . . . 
policeman. Thus a  town such a s  Oldham w i t h  more than  2,850 i n h a b i l  
t a n t s  pe r  policeman i n  1856 (compared w i t h  446 i n  London and 610 i n  
Manchester) a c t u a l l y  covered a  p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  s m a l l e r  a r e a  than  
e i t h e r  of t h e  l a r g e r  c i t i e s .  According t o  t h i s  measure, Oldham had 
20 policemen pe r  a c r e  whi le  Marxhester had only  12 .  ( G a t r e l l  and 
Hadden 1972: 359).  
25. A no to r ious  deputy cons t ab le  of Manchester, Joseph Nadin, en tered  
h i s  p ro fe s s ion  a s  a p rope r ty l e s s  wage e a r n e r ,  b u t  r e t i r e d  a  man of 
commerce w i t h  investments  i n  l o c a l  i ndus t ry .  
26. The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f f e red  he re  fo l lows  t h e  d a t a  much more c l o s e l y  
than  Tobias '  own. Tobias i n  f a c t  o f f e r s  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  evidence 
of cr ime i n  Leeds only  t o  demonstrate  t h a t  i t  conforms t o  no reason- 
a b l e  hypothes is  p r e d i c t i n g  crime rates. 
27. Sources f o r  F igu re  8:  C. E. Nicolas ,  Les budgets  d e  l a  France 'depuis  
\ l e  commencement du XIXe s i e c l e  ( P a r i s ,  1882) and Annuaire d e  1'Economie 
P o l i t i q u e  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  years .  Data a b s t r a c t e d  from t h e s e  sources  
by J e r a l d  Hage, t o  whom we a r e  g r a t e f u l .  F igu res  f o r  numbers of 
gendarmes i n  t h e  Almanac de  Gotha, s i n g l e  yea r s ,  1844 t o  1 8 9 0 , ' r u n  
about  30 percent  h igher  than t h e  AEP f i g u r e s .  Over t h e  1 9  yea r s  i n  
which we have bo th  Gotha and AEP f i g u r e s  f o r  gendarmes, t h e  two s e r i e s  
a r e  c o r r e l a t e d  .76. Over t h e  24 yea r s  i n  which we have bo th  n a t i o n a l  
budget f i g u r e s  f o r  gendarmes and t h e  Gotha f i g u r e s ,  t hose  two s e r i e s  
a r e  c o r r e l a t e d  .40. Since t h e  Almanac d e  Gotha f r e q u e n t l y  r e p e a t s  
t h e  same f i g u r e s  from year  t o  year  (e .g . ,  r e p o r t i n g  p r e c i s e l y  27,014 
gendarmes i n  every  year  from 1874 through 1880),  w e  have r e j e c t e d  
t h e  Gotha f i g u r e s  i n  favor  of t h e  AEP. 
28. The women in the same insurrections wpre . . too Pew Qpd too poorly 
" 0  
identi£ied for us t,o draw conclusions about t ~ e i r ~ ' g o c i q ; j  q r i g l ~ s ,  ... 
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